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Chapter 1
Introduction
Consider a generic sample space Ω. Following Knight (1933), we can distin-
guish between two types of uncertainty about Ω: a determinate uncertainty,
called determinacy, and an indeterminate uncertainty, called indeterminacy.
We say that our beliefs about Ω are determinate if, given two gambles (i.e.,
bounded random variables) X and Y on Ω, either we prefer one gamble to
the other, or the two gambles are equivalent. We say that our beliefs about Ω
are indeterminate if, given two gambles X and Y on Ω, it is possible that the
two gambles are not equivalent given our beliefs but we cannot specify any
preference between them. In other words: our beliefs are indeterminate if our
knowledge about Ω is not sufficient to express a preference for any arbitrary
pair of gambles X and Y on Ω. In practical decision problems, indetermi-
nacy can lead to a situation of indecision that cannot occur in a situation
of determinacy. Because indecision is a very common situation in practical
decision problems, indeterminacy deserves to be modelled mathematically in
an adequate way.
Determinacy and indeterminacy can both be modelled using probabilities.
The difference between the two types of uncertainty lies in the way proba-
bilities are specified. As explained by Walley (1991), determinacy is usually
modelled using precise probabilities, while to model indeterminacy we need
imprecise probabilities. Consider for example two event indicators IA and IB
defined on the same sample space Ω. We interpret the two event indicators
as 0-1 gambles: with the gamble IA (IB) we get 1 dollar if an event A (B)
occurs and nothing elsewhere. If we are able to specify precise probabilities
for the events A and B, denoted P (A) and P (B), then whether we can ex-
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press a preference or the two gambles are equivalent. In fact we prefer IA to
IB if P (A) > P (B), we prefer IB to IA if P (B) > P (A), and we consider the
two gambles equivalent if P (B) = P (A). We follow De Finetti (1970) in the
interpretation of probabilities as betting rates. Following this interpretation,
the probability P (A) corresponds to the price that we would be willing to
pay to buy the gamble IA and to the price that we would be willing to ac-
cept to sell the same gamble. But this situation is not realistic in practice,
because usually the Infimum selling price and the Supremum buying price
for a gamble of the type described above are not identical. In particular the
Infimum selling price is usually higher than the Supremum buying price. In
this case we cannot specify a single precise probability P (A) for the event A,
but we have to specify a lower probability P (A), corresponding to the Supre-
mum buying price for IA, and an upper probability P (A), corresponding to
the Infimum selling price. The probabilities assigned to the event A in this
case are said to be imprecise, because we assign to the event A a probability
interval [P (A), P (A)] instead of a single value P (A). Imprecise probabilities
are used to model indeterminacy. Suppose that we specify lower and upper
probabilities for the events A and B of the lotteries above. If P (A) > P (B)
we prefer IA to IB, if P (B) > P (A) we prefer IB to IA, but if P (A) ≤ P (B)
and P (B) ≤ P (A), then we are unable to express a preference between the
two lotteries, although the two lotteries are not necessarily equivalent. We
are therefore in a situation of indecision.
According to Walley (1991), there are many possible sources of indetermi-
nacy. For example: lack of information concerning Ω, conflicting information
and beliefs, information of limited relevance, physical indeterminacy. But,
again according to Walley, the most important source of indeterminacy is the
lack of information concerning Ω. The lack of information about a gamble
IA can be measured by quantifying the difference between the upper and the
lower probability assigned to the event A, the so called degree of imprecision.
The degree of imprecision, in this case, ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 reflects
complete knowledge (and therefore precise probabilities) about the gamble
IA and 1 reflects complete ignorance. The degree of imprecision is equal to 1
only with vacuous probabilities, i.e., only if the lower probability is set to 0
and the upper probability is set to 1. According to Walley (1991), vacuous
probabilities about a 0-1 gamble mean that we would pay up to 0 dollars to
buy the gamble IA and we would be payed at least 1 dollar to sell the same
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gamble. In fact, this approach is suited to describe a situation of complete
ignorance about A. This is the way complete ignorance about the event A is
modelled, using probabilities, in the field of imprecise probabilities.
We focus now on a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X ,
where X = {x1, . . . , xk}, and unknown chances ϑ ∈ Θ, where
Θ := {ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) |
k∑
i=1
ϑi = 1, 0 ≤ ϑi ≤ 1}.
Suppose that we have no relevant prior information about ϑ and we are
therefore in a situation of prior ignorance about X. How should we model
our prior beliefs in order to reflect the initial lack of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models
of uncertainty, such as Bayesian probability and Walley’s theory of coherent
lower previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modelled using a sin-
gle prior probability distribution. The problem of defining a standard prior
probability distribution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called
noninformative prior, has been an important research topic in the last two
centuries1 and, despite the numerous contributions, it remains an open re-
search issue, as illustrated by Kass and Wassermann (1996). See also Hutter
(2006) for recent developments and complementary considerations. There
are many principles and properties that are desirable to model a situation of
prior ignorance and that have been used in past research to define noninfor-
mative priors. For example Laplace’s symmetry or indifference principle has
suggested, in case of finite possibility spaces, the use of the uniform distri-
bution. Other principles, like for example the principle of invariance under
group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the conjugate pri-
ors principle, etc., have suggested the use of other noninformative priors, in
particular for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or more of these
principles. But, in general, it has proven to be difficult to define a standard
noninformative prior satisfying, at the same time, all the desirable principles.
1Starting from the work of Laplace at the beginning of the 19th century (Laplace
(1820)).
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We follow De Cooman and Miranda (2006) when they say that there are
at least two principles that should be satisfied to model a situation of prior
ignorance: the symmetry and the embedding principles. The symmetry prin-
ciple states that, if we are ignorant a priori about ϑ, then we have no reason
to favour one possible outcome of X to another, and therefore our probability
model on X should be symmetric. This principle recalls Laplace’s symmetry
or indifference principle that, in the past decades, has suggested the use of
the uniform prior as standard noninformative prior. The embedding prin-
ciple states that, for each possible event A, the probability assigned to A
should not depend on the possibility space X in which A is embedded. In
particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event A should be invariant
with respect to refinements and coarsenings of X . It is easy to show that the
embedding principle is not satisfied by the uniform distribution. How should
we model our prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two principles? Walley
(1991) gives a compelling answer to this question: he proves2 that the only
coherent probability model on X consistent with the two principles is the vac-
uous probability model, i.e., the model that assigns, for each non-trivial event
A, lower probability P(A) = 0 and upper probability P(A) = 1. Clearly,
the vacuous probability model cannot be expressed using a single probability
distribution. It follows that, if we agree that the symmetry and the embed-
ding principles are characteristics of prior ignorance, then we need imprecise
probabilities to model such a state of beliefs.3 Unfortunately, it is easy to
show that updating the vacuous probability model on X produces only vac-
uous posterior probabilities. Therefore, the vacuous probability model alone
is not a viable way to address our initial problem. Walley (1991) suggests,
as an alternative, the use of near-ignorance priors.
A near-ignorance prior is a probability model on the chances θ of X, mod-
elling a very weak state of knowledge about θ. In practice, a near-ignorance
prior is a large closed convex setM0 of prior probability densities4 on θ which
produces vacuous expectations for various functions f on Θ, i.e., such that
E(f) = infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and E(f) = supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ). The key point is that near-
ignorance priors can be designed so as to satisfy both the symmetry and the
2In Note 7, p. 526. See also Section 5.5 of the same book.
3For a complementary point of view, see Hutter (2006).
4A set of probability masses or densities is often called credal set, according to Levi
(1980).
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embedding principles. In fact, if a near-ignorance prior produces vacuous
expectations for all the functions f(θ) = θi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then,
because a priori P (X = xi) = E(θi), the near-ignorance prior implies the
vacuous probability model on X and satisfies therefore both the symmetry
and the embedding principle, thus delivering a satisfactory model of prior
(near-)ignorance.5 Updating a near-ignorance prior consists in updating all
the probability densities in M0 using the Bayes rule. Because the beliefs on
θ are not vacuous, we obtain thus a non-vacuous set of posterior probability
densities on θ that can be used to calculate posterior probabilities for X.
Walley (1996) has proposed an important model for learning under prior
near-ignorance: the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM). Suppose that the cat-
egorical variable X takes values in the set X = {x1, . . . , xk}, and denote with
ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) ∈ Θ the unknown chances of X. Let us focus on calculating
the predictive posterior probabilities P (X = xi |x) for each xi ∈ X , given
an observed sample x of length N of realizations of X, and following the
approach outlined above. The IDM models prior near-ignorance with the
set of all Dirichlet densities dir(s, t), defined on Θ for a fixed s ≥ 0 and all
t ∈ T , where the density dir(s, t) is defined by the expression
dir(s, t)(θ) :=
Γ(s)∏k
i=1 Γ(sti)
k∏
i=1
θsti−1i ,
and
T := {t = (t1, . . . , tk) |
k∑
j=1
tj = 1, 0 < tj < 1}.
Denote this prior set of densities with M0. The first moments of a dir(s, t)
density are E(θi) = ti, for each i = 1, . . . , n. Because X is a categorical
variable, we have
P (X = xi) = infM0
E(θi) = infT
ti = 0,
and
P (X = xi) = sup
M0
E(θi) = sup
T
ti = 1,
5We call this state near-ignorance because, although we are completely ignorant a priori
about X, we are not completely ignorant about θ (Walley, 1991, Section 5.3, Note 4).
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for each xi ∈ X . Therefore, a priori the IDM produces a vacuous probability
model for X and satisfies therefore both the symmetry and the embedding
principles. Posterior inference is obtained by updating each Dirichlet prior
using the observed sample. Because Dirichlet densities and the multinomial
likelihood are conjugate, this approach leads to a set of posterior Dirichlet
densities, defined by
MN :=
{
dir(N + s, tx)
∣∣∣∣ txi = axi + stiN + s , t ∈ T
}
,
where axi denotes for each xi ∈ X the number of times that we have observed
the outcome xi. The upper and lower posterior predictive probabilities are
then given by
P (X = xi |x) = infMN E(θi |x) = infT
axi + sti
N + s
=
axi
N + s
and
P (X = xi |x) = sup
MN
E(θi |x) = sup
T
axi + sti
N + s
=
axi + s
N + s
.
It follows that the posterior degree of imprecision is
P (X = xi |x)− P (X = xi |x) = a
x
i + s
N + s
− a
x
i
N + s
=
s
N + s
and depends therefore solely on N . The parameter s is a fixed parameter
that can be interpreted as a degree of caution in inference. With large val-
ues of s the degree of imprecision decreases more slowly than with smaller
values of s. For a discussion on the choice of possible values of s see Wal-
ley (1996) or Bernard (2005). The degree of imprecision in the IDM can be
interpreted as follows. Initially, with N = 0, the degree of imprecision is
equal to 1 and reflects the initial state of ignorance. As the number of obser-
vations increases, the probability intervals narrow. Therefore, the degree of
imprecision decreases, reflecting our increased knowledge about X. Note that
the IDM leads to precise probabilities in the limit, after observing infinitely
many data. The IDM has gained in the recent years considerable attention,
and is recognized as an important milestone of the field of imprecise prob-
ability, with applications such as classification (Zaffalon (2001a), Zaffalon
et al. (2003)), nonparametric inference (Bernard (2001)), robust estimation
(Hutter (2003)), analysis of contingency tables (Bernard (2003)), discovery
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of dependency structures (Zaffalon et al. (2005)), and game theory (Quaghe-
beur et al. (2003)). For a detailed overview of theory and applications of the
IDM see Bernard (2005).
The IDM is the starting point of this thesis. Our research starts from
the consideration that, in real world applications, any observed sample may
contain observation errors. The possibility of errors in the observations is
not taken into consideration by the IDM, which assumes perfect observa-
tions. In Chapter 2, we relax and extend the IDM to imperfect observations.
We assume that the categorical variable X is unobservable. For each real-
ization of X, we can observe a realization of another random variable O,
which takes values in the same possibility space of X and represents the
observed value. We model the imperfect observational mechanism using a
stochastic matrix Λ, called emission matrix, containing all the probabilities
λij := P (O = xi |X = xj), where λij is known for each i, j = 1, . . . , k. With
this generalization, the case of perfect observational mechanism is recovered
when Λ = I. We focus on constructing posterior predictive probabilities
P (X = xi |o) for each xi ∈ X , having observed a sample o of realizations
of O and knowing Λ. This extension of the IDM to imperfect observations
yields the following, at first sight surprising, results:
1. If all elements of Λ are nonzero then, for every xi ∈ X , P (X = xi |o) =
1 and P (X = xi |o) = 0.
2. P (X = xi |o) < 1 for some xi ∈ X , iff we observed at least once O = xj
such that λji = 0.
3. P (X = xi |o) > 0 for some xi ∈ X , iff we observed at least once O = xj
such that λji 6= 0 and λjr = 0 for each r 6= i in {1, . . . , k}.
In other words, if the observational process has an arbitrary small non-zero
probability to generate any sort of mistake, then the posterior probabilities of
the extended IDM are vacuous, irrespective of the observed sample. Partial
learning is possible in this setting only for very special observational processes
having some zero probabilities in the emission matrix. In other words, a
component of perfection is needed to generate useful inferences in the IDM.
These results have two different implications. The first is concrete: the IDM
can yield useful conclusions only by assuming (at least partial) perfection
of the observational process. The second implication is more philosophical
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and points to a fundamental statistical problem: prior near-ignorance seems
to be incompatible with learning, at least in settings relevant for real-world
problems.
To understand the generality of the incompatibility of prior near-ignorance
and imperfect observations, we consider, in Chapter 3, a more general sta-
tistical setup than the one assumed by the IDM. We consider a sequence
of independent and identically distributed (IID) categorical latent variables
(Xi)i∈N with outcomes in X and unknown chances ϑ, and a sequence of in-
dependent manifest variables (Si)i∈N. We assume that a realization of the
manifest variable Si can be observed only after a (hidden) realization of the
latent variable Xi. Furthermore, we assume Si to be independent of the
chances ϑ of Xi conditional on Xi, i.e.,
P (Si |Xi = xj, ϑ) = P (Si |Xi = xj), (1.1)
for each xj ∈ X and ϑ ∈ Θ. These assumptions model what we call an
observational process, i.e., a two-step process where the variable Si is used to
acquire information about the realized value of Xi for each i, independently
on the chances of Xi. We focus on a very general problem of parametric infer-
ence. Suppose that we observe a dataset s of realizations of manifest variables
S1, . . . , SN related to the (unobservable) dataset x ∈ XN of realizations of
the variables X1, . . . ,XN . Defining the random variables X := (X1, . . . ,XN)
and S := (S1, . . . , SN) we have S = s and X = x. Given a bounded function
f(θ), our aim is to calculate E(f | s) and E(f | s) starting from a condition of
near-ignorance about f , i.e., using a generic near-ignorance prior M0 such
that E(f) = fmin := infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and E(f) = fmax : supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ). In such a
setting, we introduce a condition, related to the likelihood of the observed
data, that is shown to be sufficient to prevent learning about X under prior
near-ignorance. The condition is very general as it is developed for any prior
that models near-ignorance (not only the one used in the IDM), and for very
general kinds of relation between X and S. We show then, by simple exam-
ples, that such a condition is easily satisfied, even in the most elementary
and common statistical problems.
The results of Chapter 3 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use
of near-ignorance priors in practical applications. To produce non-vacuous
posterior predictive probabilities for a categorical latent variable starting
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from a condition of very weak knowledge, it is necessary to develop new
models with a very weak specification of prior knowledge that are stronger
than prior near-ignorance.
In Chapter 4, we propose such a model. We obtain a new model modify-
ing the IDM with an additional assumption that restricts slightly the set of
prior densities by eliminating the problematic quasi-deterministic ones. We
focus on the two-dimensional version of the IDM, the imprecise Beta model
(IBM) (see Bernard (1996), Walley (1991) and Walley (1996)). We consider
a setting similar to the one of Chapter 2, but assume that the probabilities of
errors are small. We assume a symmetric emission matrix (in this case, a 2×2
matrix), so that the probability of error is the probability of confounding one
outcome with the other. This setting is relevant for applications because in
the practice one is often tempted to use a model for perfect observations like
the IBM when the probability of an observation error can be assumed to be
small. This approach, however, is inconsistent with our previous theoretical
findings. In Chapter 4 we propose an additional assumption to the IBM,
called quasi perfection, that is natural when the probability of error is small.
The assumption is based on the intuition that, having observed a small sam-
ple with very small probability of error, one does not usually expect to have
errors in the sample. We show that this assumption yields to a restriction of
the set of priors in the IBM, where the restriction depends on the probability
of error and the strength of the assumption. We show that the restricted
IBM is actually able to learn from imperfect observations under a very weak
specification of prior knowledge. Furthermore, the results produced by the
restricted IBM can be arbitrarily close to those produced by the IBM for per-
fect observations considering the observed sample as perfect, depending on
the probability of error and the strength of the additional assumption. This
last finding has some potential for the IBM in applications characterized by
a small probability of observation errors. The model in Chapter 4 is only
a first step towards a theory of learning from imperfect observations under
weak prior knowledge. There are still many research issues and questions
that remain to be investigated. These topics, as well as the relevance and
the limits of the present work, are discussed in the concluding Chapter 5.
Outline. This work consists of three main chapters organized as indepen-
dent papers. Differences across chapters are therefore possible in the nota-
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tion and terminology. However, the three chapters can also be read as a
unique discussion about the problem of the incompatibility between prior
near-ignorance and imperfect observations. From this perspective, Chapter
2 represents the discovery of the problem, Chapter 3 its generalization and
conceptualization and Chapter 4 a first attempt to solve it in a simple, par-
ticular but important case. Chapter 2 has been published as Piatti et al.
(2005). Chapters 3 and 4 are the papers Piatti et al. (2006a) and Piatti et
al. (2006b). Both papers are actually submitted.
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Chapter 2
Limits of learning from
imperfect observations under
prior near-ignorance: the case
of the imprecise Dirichlet
model
2.1 Summary
History
The problem of vacuous probabilities in the IDM with imperfect observations
was first discovered in the month of July of 2004 thanks to computational
simulations. The effect was then proved theoretically in the following months.
A first version of the paper was submitted to the Society for Imprecise Prob-
ability Theory and Applications (SIPTA) in February 2005 for presentation
at the International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities Theory and their
Applications (ISIPTA ’05). The paper was accepted in April 2005 and the
definitive version, reproduced in this chapter, was presented at ISIPTA ’05
in a plenary session in Pittsburgh in the month of July 2005. The paper was
then published in the Proceedings of the Symposium as Piatti et al. (2005).
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Abstract
Consider a relaxed multinomial setup, in which there may be mistakes in
observing the outcomes of the process—this is often the case in real applica-
tions. What can we say about the next outcome if we start learning about
the process in conditions of prior near-ignorance? To answer this question
we extend the imprecise Dirichlet model to the case of imperfect observations
and we focus on posterior predictive probabilities for the next outcome. The
results are very surprising: the posterior predictive probabilities are vacu-
ous, irrespectively of the amount of observations we do, and however small
is the probability of doing mistakes. In other words, the imprecise Dirichlet
model cannot help us to learn from data when the observational mechanism
is imperfect. This result seems to rise a serious question about the use of
the imprecise Dirichlet model for practical applications, and, more gener-
ally, about the possibility to learn from imperfect observations under prior
near-ignorance.
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2.2 Introduction
Consider the basic multinomial setup: an unknown process produces a se-
quence of symbols, from a finite alphabet, in an identically and independently
distributed way. What is the probability of the next symbol produced? Wal-
ley’s imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM) Walley (1996) offers an appealing so-
lution to the predictive problem: it yields lower and upper probabilities of
the next symbol that are initially vacuous and that converge to a precise
probability as the sequence grows. The IDM can be regarded as a general-
ization of Bayesian inference to imprecise probability (Sect. 2.3), originated
by the attempt to model prior ignorance about the process in an objective-
minded way. The IDM is an important model as it yields credible inferences
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under prior near-ignorance, and because the multinomial setup is an ab-
straction of many important real problems. The IDM has indeed attracted
considerable attention in the recent years; see, for example, the application
of the IDM to classification (Zaffalon (2001a), Zaffalon (2002)), nonparamet-
ric inference (Bernard (2001)), robust estimation (Hutter (2003)), analysis
of contingency tables (Bernard (2003)), discovery of dependency structures
(Zaffalon (2001b)), and game theory (Quaghebeur et al. (2003)).
But in real problems there is a, perhaps very small, probability of doing
mistakes in the process of observing the sequence. It seems therefore worth
relaxing the basic multinomial setup in order to consider the occurrence of
imperfect observations, as in Section 2.4. We imagine a two-steps process
to this extent: a multinomial process produces so-called ideal symbols from
the alphabet, that we cannot observe; a subsequent observational mechanism
takes the ideal symbols and produces the so-called actual symbols, which we
do observe. The more accurate the observational mechanism, the more the
ideal sequence will coincide with the actual sequence, and vice versa. But in
any case, we assume that there exists a non-zero probability of mistake: the
probability that the observational mechanism turns an ideal symbol into a
different symbol of the alphabet.
We are interested in the following problem: can we compute the proba-
bility of the next ideal symbol, starting in a state of prior near-ignorance and
observing only the actual sequence? To answer this question, we model prior
ignorance at the ideal level with the IDM, and combine it with the imperfect
observational mechanism at the actual level. The overall model generalizes
the IDM, which is recovered in the case the probability of mistake is set to
zero.
The outcome of the newly created model in Section 2.4.2 is very sur-
prising: the predictive probabilities of the next ideal symbol are vacuous,
irrespectively of the amount of symbols in the actual sequence, and of the
accuracy of the observational mechanism! In other words, the model tells
that it is not possible to learn with prior near-ignorance and an imperfect
observational mechanism, no matter how small is the probability of error—
provided that it is not zero, as in IDM. In the attempt to attack the vacuity
problem we consider a weaker model for the observational mechanism: in
Section 2.4.5 we assume that the probability of mistake, rather than being a
constant, lies between 0 and 1 according to some distribution. The situation
is unchanged: the probabilities are vacuous whatever precise distribution we
choose.
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This strong kind of discontinuity seems to rise a serious question about the
IDM: what is the meaning of using the IDM for real problems? Indeed, the
result seems to tell us that we cannot use the IDM as an approximation to
more realistic models that admit the possibility of an imperfect observational
mechanisms, just because the transition between these and the IDM is not at
all continuous. One might say that this does not need to be a serious prob-
lem, as in the real world we are only concerned with actual symbols, rather
than ideal ones. But in Section 2.5 it turns out that even the probabilities of
the next actual symbol are vacuous for any length of the observed sequence
and any accuracy of the observational mechanism.
2.3 The imprecise Dirichlet model
In this paper we consider an infinite population of individuals which can
be classified in k categories (or types) from the set X = {x1, . . . , xk}. The
proportion of units of type xi is denoted by ϑi and called the chance of
xi. Then, the vector of chances ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) is a point in the closed
k-dimensional unit simplex1
Θ := {ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) |
k∑
i=1
ϑi = 1, 0 ≤ ϑi ≤ 1}.
We define a random variable X with values in X which consists in drawing an
individual at random from the population. Clearly the chance that X = xi
is ϑi. Our problem is to predict the probability of drawing an individual of
type xi from a population of unknown chances ϑ after having observed N
independent random draws and starting from prior near-ignorance. Having
observed a dataset x, we can summarize the observation with the counts
a = (ax1 , . . . , a
x
k) where ai is the number of individuals of type xi observed
in the dataset x and with
∑k
i=1 ai = N . For given ϑ, the probability of
observing a dataset x with counts a given ϑ is equal to P (x |ϑ) = ϑa11 · · ·ϑakk .
In this section we assume that each individual in the population is perfectly
observable, i.e., the observer can determine the exact category of each in-
dividual without committing mistakes, and we solve our problem using the
standard imprecise Dirichlet model.
1The symbol ’:=’ denotes a definition.
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2.3.1 Bayesian inference and Dirichlet prior density
In the Bayesian setting we learn from observed data using Bayes rule, which
is formulated as follows. Consider a dataset x and the unknown chances θ.
Then
p(θ|x) = P (x|θ) · p(θ)
P (x)
, (2.1)
provided that
P (x) =
∫
Θ
P (x|θ)p(θ)dθ 6= 0,
where p(θ) is some density measure on Θ. The probability measure P (x|θ)
is called the likelihood, p(θ) is called the prior density and p(θ|x) is called
the posterior density. Bayesian inference enables us to update our confidence
on θ given the data by representing it as P (θ |x). Bayesian inference relies
on the specification of a prior density on Θ. A common choice of prior in
the multinomial setting is the Dirichlet density measure that is defined as
follows.
Definition 1 The Dirichlet density dir(s, t) is defined on the closed k-dimensional
simplex Θ and is given by the expression
dir(s, t)(θ) :=
Γ(s)∏k
i=1 Γ(sti)
k∏
i=1
θsti−1i ,
where s is a positive real number, Γ is the Gamma function and t = (t1, . . . , tk) ∈
T , where T is the open k-dimensional simplex
T := {t = (t1, . . . , tk) |
k∑
j=1
tj = 1, 0 < tj < 1}.
We recall first some important properties of Dirichlet densities.
Lemma 2 (First moment) The first moments of a dir(s, t) density are
given by E(θi) = ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
For a proof of Lemma 2 see Kotz et al. (2000).
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Remark 3 In a multinomial setting we have
P (xi) =
∫
Θ
P (xi | θ) · p(θ)dθ =
=
∫
Θ
θi · p(θ)dθ = E(θi).
In particular, if p(θ) is a dir(s, t) density, P (xi) = E(θi) = ti.
Proposition 4 Consider a dataset x with counts a = (ax1 , . . . , a
x
k). Then the
following equality holds
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j · dir(s, t) =
=
∏k
j=1 ·
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1)
· dir(sx, tx),
where sx := N+s and txj :=
aj+stj
N+s
. When aj = 0 we set
∏0
i=1(stj+i−1) := 1,
for each 0 < tj < 1, by definition.
The proof of Proposition 4 and all the other proofs of this chapter are in
Section 2.7.
Remark 5 Using a dir(s, t) density measure as prior in a Bayesian learning
problem with categorical data we have p(θ) = dir(s, t) and
P (x|θ) =
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j . (2.2)
According to Proposition 4, the posterior density is then given by P (θ|x) =
dir(sx, tx) and therefore
P (xi |x) = txi =
ai + sti
N + s
. (2.3)
Moreover, comparing (2.1) with the equality of Proposition 4, we conclude
that
P (x) =
∏k
j=1
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1)
. (2.4)
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2.3.2 The imprecise Dirichlet model
The Imprecise Dirichlet Model (IDM) (see Bernard (1996) andWalley (1996))
is a model that generalizes Bayesian learning from categorical data to the case
when there is prior near-ignorance about θ. Prior near-ignorance about θ is
modelled using the set of all the Dirichlet densities dir(s, t) for a fixed s and
all t in T ; that is, the IDM uses a set of prior densities instead of a single
prior. The probability of each category xi a priori is vacuous, i.e., P (xi) ∈
[infT ti, supT ti] = [0, 1]. Prior ignorance is therefore modelled by assigning
vacuous prior probabilities to each category of X . For each prior density
one calculates, using Bayes rule, a posterior density and obtains, taking into
accounts the whole set of priors, a set of posteriors. Let now s > 0 be given
and consider the set of prior densities M0 := {dir(s, t) | t ∈ T }. Suppose
that we observe the dataset x with corresponding counts a = (ax1 , . . . , a
x
k).
Then, the set of resulting posterior densities follows from Proposition 4 and
is given by
MN :=
{
dir(N + s, tx)
∣∣∣∣ txj = aj + stjN + s , t ∈ T
}
.
Definition 6 Given a set of probability measures P, the upper probabil-
ity P is given by P (·) := supP∈P P (·), the lower probability P by P (·) :=
infP∈P P (·).
Remark 7 The upper and lower posterior predictive probabilities of a cate-
gory xi in the IDM are found letting ti → 1, resp. ti → 0, and are given by
P (xi |x) = ai+sN+s and P (xi |x) = aiN+s for each i.
Remark 8 The IDM with k = 2 is usually called Imprecise Beta Model
(IBM), because the Dirichlet densities with k = 2 are beta densities (see
Bernard (1996) and Walley (1991)).
2.4 The imprecise Dirichlet model with im-
perfect observational mechanism
The standard IDM was originally defined for perfect observational mecha-
nisms. But, in practice, there is always a (perhaps small) probability of
making mistakes during the observational process. Often, if this probabil-
ity is small, one assumes that the data are perfectly observable in order to
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use a simple model; doing so, one implicitly assumes that there is a sort of
continuity between models with perfectly observable data and models with
small probability of errors in the observations. In this section, our aim is
to generalize the IDM to the case of imperfect observational mechanisms,
and construct posterior predictive probabilities in order to verify if the im-
plicit assumption described above is acceptable in practice. We model our
imperfect observational mechanism with a two-step model. In the first step,
a random variable X is generated with chances ϑ. In the second step, given
the value of X, a second categorical random variable O with values in X is
generated from X. We define the chances λij := P (O = xi |X = xj). All
such chances can be collected in a k × k matrix, called the emission matrix,
Λ :=
 λ11 · · · λ1k... . . . ...
λk1 · · · λkk
 . (2.5)
Then, the chances ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξk) of the random variable O are given by
ξi =
k∑
j=1
λij · θj. (2.6)
Matrix Λ is stochastic, that is in each column the elements sum to one. We
assume that each row of the emission matrix has at least an element differ-
ent from zero; in the opposite case we could define O on a strict subset of
X . Consider a dataset o generated by the above two-step model. For each
dataset o generated at the actual level and composed by realizations of the
random variable O, there exists at the ideal level an unobservable dataset
x, of realizations of X, such that o was generated from x by the observa-
tional mechanism. Knowing x, makes o not to depend on the chances ϑ of
X. We can therefore summarize the two step model with the independence
assumption
p(o,x, θ) = P (o |x)P (x | θ)p(θ). (2.7)
2.4.1 The IDM with imperfect observational mecha-
nism
We use now the above two-step model to generalize the IDM to the case
of imperfect observational mechanism. We begin calculating the posterior
predictive probabilities for a given prior.
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Lemma 9 Suppose that we have observed a dataset o and we construct the
posterior predictive probabilities p(X = xi |o) using Bayes rule and a prior
dir(s, t). Then
P (X = xi |o) =
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · a
x
i +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
. (2.8)
If we consider now each prior density in the set M0 and we calculate
the posterior predictive probabilities P (X = xi |o) using (2.8) we obtain a
generalization of the IDM to the case of imperfect observational mechanism.
It is interesting to remark that, in this case, the set of posterior densities
consists of convex combinations of Dirichlet density measures and not of
Dirichlet densities as in the IDM with perfect observational mechanism.
2.4.2 Vacuous predictive probabilities
In this section we study the behavior of the above generalization of the IDM
in order to compare it with the standard IDM. The results are surprising: we
show that there is a drastic discontinuity between the results obtained with
the IDM with perfect observational mechanism and those obtained assuming
an imperfect observational mechanism. In particular, the IDM with an emis-
sion matrix without zero elements produces vacuous predictive probabilities
for each category in X . This effect is observed also if the elements not on
the diagonal of Λ are very small. It follows that, using a model with perfect
observational mechanism in order to approximate a model with imperfect
observational mechanism but very small probability of errors, does not seem
to be justifiable from a theoretical point of view. Our results are summarized
by the following theorem.
Theorem 10 Assume that we have observed a dataset o with counts n =
(n1, . . . , nk) and that the observational mechanism is characterized by an
emission matrix Λ. Then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the following results hold.
1. If all the elements of Λ are nonzero, then the IDM produces vacuous
predictive probabilities, i.e., P (X = xi |o) = 1 and P (X = xi |o) = 0.
2. The IDM produces P (X = xi |o) < 1, iff ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that
nj > 0 and λji = 0.
3. The IDM produces P (X = xi |o) > 0, iff ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that
nj > 0, λji 6= 0 and λjr = 0 for each r 6= i.
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2.4.3 Examples
We illustrate the results with two examples in the binary case.
Example 11 Consider a situation with k = 2, s = 2, N = 2 and an emis-
sion matrix
Λε :=
(
1− ε ε
ε 1− ε
)
, (2.9)
where ε > 0. Suppose that we have observed the dataset o = (x1, x1) and
therefore the count n = (2, 0). The probabilities of the observed dataset given
the different possible datasets of X 2 are given by
P (o|(x1, x1)) = (1− ε) · (1− ε) > 0
P (o|(x1, x2)) = (1− ε) · ε > 0
P (o|(x2, x1)) = (1− ε) · ε > 0
P (o|(x2, x2)) = ε · ε > 0.
Using (2.8), the posterior probability P (x1|o) is given by
P (X = x1|o) =
=
(
(1− ε) · (1− ε) · st1(1 + st1) · 2 + st1
2 + s
+
+2 · (1− ε) · ε · st1 · st2 · 1 + st1
2 + s
+
+ ε · ε · st2 · (1 + st2) · 0 + st1
2 + s
)
·
·
(
(1− ε) · (1− ε) · st1(1 + st1) +
+2 · (1− ε) · ε · st1 · st2+
+ ε · ε · st2 · (1 + st2)
)−1
.
It follows that
lim
t1→1
P (X = x1|o) = (1− ε)
2 · s(1 + s)
(1− ε)2 · s(1 + s) = 1,
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and
lim
t1→0
P (X = x1|o) = ε
2 · s(1 + s) · 0
ε2 · s(1 + s) = 0,
implying
P (X = x1|o) = 0, P (X = x1|o) = 1.
The same result holds for P (X = x2|o).
Remark 12 The result of Example 11 holds for each positive, even very
small, value of ε. With ε = 0 we obtain Λ = I, therefore
P (X = x1|o) = 2 + st1
2 + s
,
P (X = x2|o) = 0 + st2
2 + s
,
and the same o yields
P (X = x1 |o) = 2 + 2
2 + 2
= 1,
P (X = x1 |o) = 2
2 + 2
= 0.5,
P (X = x2 |o) = 0 + 2
2 + 2
= 0.5,
P (X = x2 |o) = 0
2 + 2
= 0.
This makes it clear that there is a strong kind of discontinuity between the
result for Λ = I and the results for Λ = Λε, even for very small ε.
Example 13 Suppose that we have observed a dataset o with counts n =
(12, 23) and assume that the emission matrix is
Λ =
(
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
)
.
Figure 2.1 displays the results for P (X = x1|o) obtained with the IDM for
s = 2. It is interesting to remark that the problem of vacuous probabilities
arises very near the boundaries of T . In the first plot,where the function is
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Figure 2.1: The function P (X = x1|o) for t1 ∈ [0, 1] and for t1 ∈ [0.99999, 1].
plotted in the interval t1 ∈ [0, 1], it seems that P (X = x1|o) is about 0.34.
But if we look at the second plot, where the function is plotted more precisely
in the interval t1 ∈ [0.99999, 1] we see clearly that P (X = x1|o) = 1 as
confirmed by theoretical results.
2.4.4 Discussion
The results stated in Theorem 10 can be explained in an intuitive way. To
understand the meaning of Statement 2 of Theorem 10, consider an observer
with a unique extreme prior density p(θ) = dir(s, t), such that s > 0 and ti →
1 for an i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The observer believes a priori that the population
is formed (almost) completely by individuals of category xi. If he observes
an individual of category xj and λji 6= 0, he will tend to believe that the
individual observed is actually of category xi and that there was a mistake
in the observational mechanism. Only if λji = 0 he has to rationally realize
that observing something different from xi can only be consistent with a
modification of his strong prior beliefs.
To understand the meaning of Statement 3 of Theorem 10, consider now
an observer with ti → 0. Such an observer believes a priori that there are
almost no individuals of category xi in the population. If he observes an
individual of category xi, he will believe that the actual category is another
category xj such that tj > 0 and λij > 0. The observer cannot rationally
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believe that X = xj, only if λij = 0 for all j 6= i. Similarly, if there exists a
j, such that nj > 0, λji 6= 0 and λjr = 0 for all r 6= i, then observing O = xj
we know for sure that X = xi.
When letting the prior density of an observer converge to a degenerate
one, the model with imperfect observational mechanism produces trivial re-
sults because of the degeneration in the behavior of the observer. Such a
feature arises only with extreme prior densities. To avoid vacuous inferences
it would be sufficient to restrict the set of prior densities closing the sim-
plex T in a way to exclude these degenerate priors. However, this is not
compatible with the idea of prior ignorance, which a priori should lead to
P (X = xi) = 0, P (X = xi) = 1,
for each i = 1, . . . , k.
2.4.5 The case of non-deterministic emission matrix
Up to this point we have assumed an observational mechanism with known
and constant emission matrix. In this section, in order to generalize Theorem
10, we study in detail the behavior of the IDM when the emission matrix is
not deterministic and changes over time. We show that the IDM produces
also in this case vacuous predictive probabilities. We prove firstly some re-
sults about the imprecise Beta model, and then extend the results to the
IDM.
Corollary 14 The IBM with observational mechanism defined by the emis-
sion matrix (2.9), where ε 6= 0, produces vacuous probabilities.
Allowing now the observational mechanism to vary over time, we obtain
however the same result:
Theorem 15 The IBM with observational mechanism for the i-th observa-
tion defined by the emission matrix
Λεi :=
(
1− εi εi
εi 1− εi
)
, (2.10)
where εi 6= 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, produces vacuous probabilities.
In the following theorem we allow the emission matrices to be non-deterministic
and we summarize our knowledge about εi with a continuous density mea-
sure. We obtain once more the same result.
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Theorem 16 The IBM with observational mechanism for the i-th observa-
tion defined by the emission matrix (2.10) , where ε := (ε1, . . . , εN) is dis-
tributed according to a continuous density f(ε) defined on [0, 1]N , produces
vacuous predictive probabilities.
Theorem 16 can be easily generalized to the k-dimensional case. Define
the set Sk×k of k × k stochastic matrices. Assume that N observations
are characterized by N emission matrices Λ1, . . . ,ΛN ∈ Sk×k. Define ∆ :=
(Λ1, . . . ,ΛN). The following theorem holds.
Theorem 17 If ∆ is distributed according to a continuous distribution func-
tion f(∆) defined on (Sk×k)N , then the IDM produces vacuous predictive
probabilities.
2.5 The actual level
One might say that the problem of vacuous predictive probabilities for the
ideal symbols could be avoided considering only the actual symbols and ap-
plying therefore the standard IDM at the actual level. In fact the random
variable O, defined in Section 2.4, is perfectly observable by definition. There-
fore, having observed a dataset o, apparently it should be possible to produce
useful inferences on the chances ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξk) of O using the standard IDM.
Assuming the emission matrix Λ to be given, it would then be possible to
reconstruct the chances ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) using ξ and Λ. In particular, from
(4.25), it follows that ξ = Λ · θ. If Λ is a non-singular matrix, we have
θ = Λ−1 · ξ. In this section we show why the approach described above does
not work. We restrict the discussion for simplicity to the binary case (k = 2)
with emission matrix (2.9) and ε 6= 0.5. Consider the chances θ = (θ1, θ2)
of the unobservable random variable X and the chances ξ = (ξ1, ξ2) of the
observable random variable O. Since the matrix (2.9) with ε 6= 0.5 is non-
singular, we can reconstruct the values of θ starting from the values of ξ. We
have ξ1 = (1− ε)θ1 + εθ2 and ξ2 = (1− ε)θ2 + εθ1. For simplicity we assume
in the calculations that ε < 0.5, such that 1 − 2ε > 0. All results are valid
also for 0.5 < ε < 1. Because θ1+θ2 = 1, we have ξi = (1−2ε)θi+ε, i = 1, 2,
and
θi =
ξi − ε
1− 2ε. (2.11)
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It follows that
E(θi) =
E(ξi)− ε
1− 2ε . (2.12)
2.5.1 Inference on O ignoring the emission matrix
We follow the approach described above in order to show that meaningless
results are produced. In particular we apply the standard IBM at the actual
level disregarding the fact that O is produced from X by the observational
mechanism. Consider an observed dataset o with counts n = (n1, n2) and
length N = n1 + n2. Applying the standard IBM we obtain
P (O = xi |o) = ni
N + s
,
P (O = xi |o) = ni + s
N + s
.
Now we use (2.12) to construct P (X = xi |o) and P (X = xi |o), we obtain
P (X = xi |o) = ni − ε(N + s)
(N + s)(1− 2ε) ,
P (X = xi |o) = ni + s− ε(N + s)
(N + s)(1− 2ε) .
It is easy to see that, if ni < ε(N + s), then P (X = xi |o) < 0 and, if
ni+ s < ε(N + s), then P (X = xi |o) < 0. Therefore this approach produces
meaningless results in general.
Example 18 Suppose that we have observed the dataset o with counts n1 = 0
and n2 = 10 and that our observational mechanism is characterized by (2.9)
with ε = 0.2. Applying the standard IBM with s = 2 at the actual level we
obtain at the ideal level,
P (X = x1 |o) = −0.05,
P (X = x2 |o) = 1.05.
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2.5.2 Inference on O considering the emission matrix
What is the problem of the approach described in Section 2.5.1? The problem
is the following: we know that E(θi) ∈ [0, 1] and E(ξi) = (1− 2ε)E(θi) + ε, it
follows immediately that E(ξi) ∈ [ε, 1− ε]. But if we use the standard IBM
to make inference on ξ we are implicitly assuming that, a priori, E(ξi) ∈ [0, 1]
and therefore we are doing a wrong assumption. If we model our knowledge
about θ using a beta(s, t) density, then our knowledge about ξ is modelled
by a scaled beta density on the interval [ε, 1− ε]. In fact, substituting (2.11)
in the beta(s, t) density for θ, since dθ = dξ
1−2ε , we obtain for ξ the density
C
1− 2ε
(
ξ1 − ε
1− 2ε
)st1−1( ξ2 − ε
1− 2ε
)st2−1
, (2.13)
where C := Γ(s)
Γ(st1)Γ(st2)
. We call this density scaled beta density. The first
moments of a scaled beta density are given by
E(θi) = (1− 2ε)ti + ε. (2.14)
To be consistent with the given data-generating process, the IBM on ξ should
be performed using, as set of prior densities, the set of all beta densities scaled
on [ε, 1− ε] with t ∈ T and not the standard beta densities used in the IBM.
In this way we assume a priori that ξ1, ξ2 ∈ [ε, 1 − ε]. But in this case the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 19 The IBM on ξ, with, as set of prior densities, the set of all
scaled beta densities described above, produces vacuous2 predictive probabili-
ties.
The complete proof is rather technical and is omitted. We sketch briefly
the main idea of the proof. The effect observed in this case is very similar to
the effect observed in the proof of Theorem 10. The likelihood function in
this case is given by
P (o | ξ) =
2∏
i=1
ξnii ,
but, because ξi ∈ [ε, 1−ε], the likelihood function is strictly positive for each
o. Choosing extreme values for the parameters of the prior, the likelihood is
unable to reduce this value because it cannot tend to zero, and therefore we
obtain also extreme posterior predictive probabilities.
2Note that we are abusing terminology here, as the predictive upper and lower prior
and posterior probabilities are identical, but not equal to 1 and 0.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have described the behavior of the imprecise Dirichlet model
when the observations are not perfect. We have modelled a situation charac-
terized by an imperfect observational mechanism and prior near-ignorance,
using a two step process. We have shown, in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, that
the IDM produces in general, both at the ideal and actual levels, vacuous
predictive probabilities, also for very small probability of errors. Vacuous
predictive probabilities are not produced only for very particular emission
matrices Λ. There are some interesting questions arising from the results,
in particular about the application of the IDM in practice, the assumptions
on the observational mechanism and more generally about the possibility of
learning with prior near-ignorance and imperfect observations.
1. In the light of our results, a person that uses the IDM in real ap-
plications can produce non-vacuous predictive probabilities only if he
assumes a perfect observational mechanism. But in practice this as-
sumption seems not to be tenable: we can never exclude the possibility
of an error in the observational mechanism. How can we justify using
the IDM for practical problems?
2. The behavior observed in the case of imperfect observations for the
imprecise Dirichlet model seems not to be strictly related to its par-
ticular structure. The suspicion emerges, that the behavior observed
by the IDM is only a particular case of a more general phenomenon
concerning the inference models with prior near-ignorance and imper-
fect observations. Is it really possible to learn something, starting from
prior near-ignorance and with imperfect observations?
2.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4
The Gamma function satisfies the property Γ(x + 1) = x · Γ(x). We begin
proving, by induction, following equation.
Γ(sx) =
N∏
i=1
(s+ i− 1) · Γ(s). (2.15)
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If N = 0 then Γ(sx) = Γ(s). Now assume that for N − 1 the equality
Γ(N − 1 + s) =∏N−1i=1 (s+ i− 1) · Γ(s) holds, then
Γ(N + s) = (N − 1 + s) · Γ(N − 1 + s) =
= (N − 1 + s) ·
N−1∏
i=1
(s+ i− 1) · Γ(s) =
=
N∏
i=1
(s+ i− 1) · Γ(s).
We prove now, always by induction, following equation.
Γ(sx · txj ) =
aj∏
i=1
(stj + i− 1) · Γ(stj). (2.16)
If aj = 0 then Γ(s
x · txj ) = Γ(stj). Now, assume that for aj = n − 1 the
equality
Γ(sx · txj ) = Γ(aj + stj) = Γ(n− 1 + stj) =
=
n−1∏
i=1
(stj + i− 1) · Γ(stj).
holds. Then, for aj = n we have
Γ(sx · txj ) = Γ(aj + stj) =
= Γ(n+ stj) =
= (n− 1 + stj) · Γ(n− 1 + stj) =
= (n− 1 + stj) ·
n−1∏
i=1
(stj + i− 1) · Γ(stj) =
=
n∏
i=1
(stj + i− 1) · Γ(stj) =
=
aj∏
i=1
(stj + i− 1) · Γ(stj).
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We are now ready to prove Proposition 34. We have that
dir(sx, tx) =
=
Γ(sx)∏k
j=1 Γ(s
xtxj )
·
k∏
j=1
θ
sxtxj−1
j =
=
Γ(sx)∏k
j=1 Γ(s
xtxj )
·
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j ·
k∏
j=1
θ
stj−1
j =
(2.15)+(2.16)
=
∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1) · Γ(s)∏k
j=1 ·(
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)) · Γ(stj)
·
·
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j ·
k∏
j=1
θ
stj−1
j =
=
∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1)∏k
j=1 ·
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)
·
·
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j ·
Γ(s)∏k
j=1 Γ(stj)
·
k∏
j=1
θ
stj−1
j =
=
∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1)∏k
j=1 ·
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)
·
·
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j · dir(s, t),
Therefore
k∏
j=1
θ
aj
j · dir(s, t) =
=
∏k
j=1 ·
∏aj
i=1(stj + i− 1)∏N
i=1(s+ i− 1)
· dir(sx, tx).
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Proof of Lemma 9
p(θ |o) =
∑
x∈XN
p(θ,x |o) =
=
∑
x∈XN
p(θ |x,o) · P (x |o) =
(2.7)
=
∑
x∈XN
p(θ |x) · P (x |o) =
=
∑
x∈XN
P (x | θ) · dir(s, t)
P (x)
· P (o |x) · P (x)
P (o)
=
=
∑
x∈XN
P (o |x) · P (x | θ) · dir(s, t)
P (o)
=
=
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x | θ) · dir(s, t)∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
.
This is possible if P (x) > 0 and P (o) > 0. Since tj > 0 for all j and s > 0 it
follows from (2.4) that P (x) > 0. Because all the rows of Λ are assumed to
have at least one element different from zero, for each xi there exists at least
one j such that λij 6= 0, therefore there exists at least one x with P (o |x) 6= 0
and, because P (x) > 0 for each x it follows that P (o) > 0. From Remark 5
we have P (x | θ) · dir(s, t) = P (x) · dir(sx, tx). Therefore,
P (θ |o) =
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · dir(sx, tx)∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
,
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which is a convex combination of Dirichlet density measures, and, using (2.3),
we obtain
P (X = xi |o) =
=
∫
Θ
θi ·
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · dir(sx, tx)dθ∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
=
=
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) ·
∫
Θ
θi · dir(sx, tx)dθ∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
=
(2.3)
=
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · a
x
i +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
.
Proof of Theorem 10
1. Assume that all the elements of Λ are nonzero. We show that in this
case limti→1 P (X = xi |o) = 1 and limti→0 P (X = xi |o) = 0, in other
words P (X = xi |o) = 1 and P (X = xi |o) = 0. From (2.8) we know
that
lim
ti→1
P (X = xi |o) =
= lim
ti→1
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · a
x
i +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
.
Because all the elements of Λ are nonzero, it follows immediately that
P (o |x) 6= 0 for each o and each x in XN . Define xi as the dataset with
ax
i
i = N and a
xi
j = 0 for each j 6= i. We show that limti→1 P (x) = 0
for each x ∈ XN \ {xi}. Actually, the numerator of (2.4) is a product
of terms
axj∏
r=1
(stj + r − 1). (2.17)
If axj = 0, then (2.17) is equal to one by definition. Otherwise, if a
x
j > 0
for a j 6= i, then (2.17) is equal to
stj · . . . · (stj + axj − 1). (2.18)
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If ti → 1, since t ∈ T , we have tj → 0 for each j 6= i. Because of the
first term of the product (2.18), it follows that (2.18) tends to zero as
ti → 1 and thus P (x)→ 0. At the other side we have
lim
ti→1
P (xi)
(2.17)
= lim
ti→1
∏N
r=1(sti + r − 1)∏N
j=1(s+ j − 1)
= 1.
It follows that
lim
ti→1
P (X = xi |o) (2.8)=
(2.8)
= lim
ti→1
∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x) · a
x
i +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN P (o |x) · P (x)
= lim
ti→1
P (o |xi) · 1 · ax
i
i +sti
N+s
P (o |xi) · 1 =
= lim
ti→1
ax
i
i + sti
N + s
=
N + s
N + s
= 1.
We calculate now limti→0 P (X = xi |o). In this case all the datasets in
XN with axi > 0 have limti→0 P (x) = 0, because limti→0 sti · . . . · (axi +
sti − 1) = 0. Assume for simplicity that tj 6→ 0 for each j 6= i, then
limti→0 P (x) 6= 0 for each x ∈ XN with axi = 0. It follows that
lim
ti→0
P (X = xi |o) =
=
∑
x∈XN :axi =0 P (o |x) · P (x) ·
axi +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN :axi =0 P (o |x) · P (x)
, (2.19)
and because, with axi = 0,
lim
ti→0
axi + sti
N + s
=
0 + s · 0
N + s
= 0,
we obtain limti→0 P (X = xi |o) = 0.
2. If there exists j, such that λji = 0, then it is impossible to observe
O = xj if X = xi. It follows, because nj > 0, that P (o |xi) = 0.
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With P (o |xi) = 0, we show that P (X = xi |o) < 1 for each t ∈ T ,
in particular limti→1 P (xi |o) < 1. Actually, for each x 6= xi and each
t ∈ T , we have axi +sti
N+s
≤ axi +s
N+s
< N+s
N+s
= 1, and (2.8) becomes thus a
convex sum of fractions smaller than 1, and is therefore smaller than
1.
3. If there exists j such that nj > 0, λji 6= 0 and λjr = 0 for each
r 6= i, then P (o |x) 6= 0 ⇔ axi > 0. Actually, in this case, we have
P (X = xi |O = xj) = 1 and it is therefore impossible that nj > 0 if
ai = 0. From (2.8) it follows that
P (X = xi |o) =
=
∑
x∈XN :axi >0 P (o |x) · P (x) ·
axi +sti
N+s∑
x∈XN :axi >0 P (o |x) · P (x)
,
which is a convex combination of terms
axi +sti
N+s
≥ axi
N+s
> 0
N+s
= 0, and
is therefore greater than 0 for each t ∈ T , in particular for ti → 0.
If the condition above about the emission matrix is not satisfied, then
for each j with nj > 0 there exists an r, such that λjr 6= 0 and r 6= i.
Therefore it is possible to construct a dataset x substituting xj with
xr in o for each j with nj > 0, such that P (o |x) 6= 0 and axi = 0. It
follows from (2.19) that P (xi |o) = 0.
Proofs in Section 2.4.5
Proof of Corollary 14: Corollary 14 is a particular case of Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 15: the proof of Theorem 15 is equal to the proof of
Theorem 10, except for the terms P (o |x) that contain ε1, . . . , εN instead of
a single ε. With ε1, . . . , εN 6= 0, P (o |x) 6= 0 for each o and x in XN and
therefore we obtain the same results.
To prove the other Theorems of Section 2.4.5 we need the following well-
known Lemma:
Lemma 20 (Lebesgue Theorem) Let {fn} be a series of functions on the
domain A such that fn → f pointwise. If for each n we have |fn(x)| ≤ φ(x),
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and
∫
A
φ(x)dx <∞, then
lim
n→∞
∫
A
fn(x)dx =
∫
A
f(x)dx.
Proof of Theorem 16: we know from Theorem 15 that, given ε1, . . . , εN 6=
0, we have limt1→1 P (X = x1 |o, ε) = 1, and limt1→1 P (X = x2 |o, ε) = 0.We
have
lim
t1→1
P (X = x1 |o) =
= lim
t1→1
∫
[0,1]N
P (X = x1 |o, ε) · f(ε)dε.
Furthermore P (X = xj |o, ε)·f(ε) ≤ f(ε), for any j, ε,o where
∫
[0,1]N
f(ε)dε =
1. Because of the continuity of f we know that P (εi 6= 0) = 1 for each i.
Applying Lemma 20 we conclude that
lim
t1→1
P (X = x1 |o) =
= lim
t1→1
∫
[0,1]N
P (X = x1 |o, ε) · f(ε)dε =
=
∫
[0,1]N
lim
t1→1
P (X = x1 |o, ε) · f(ε)dε =
=
∫
[0,1]N
1 · f(ε)dε = 1,
and, similarly,
lim
t1→1
P (X = x2 |o) = 0.
The proof of Theorem 17 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 16 and
is omitted.
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Chapter 3
Limits of learning about a
categorical latent variable
under prior near-ignorance
3.1 Summary
History
The necessary condition for learning under prior ignorance, stated in this
chapter, was discovered in April 2005. This condition was the starting point
for the generalization of the incompatibility between imperfect signals and
prior near-ignorance.
Abstract
It is well known that a state of complete prior ignorance is not compati-
ble with learning, at least in a coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty.
What is less widely known, is that there is another state of beliefs, called
near-ignorance, that is very similar to complete ignorance and that allows
learning to take place. What this paper does is to provide new and sub-
stantial evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be really regarded as a way
out of the problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak
beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized by a
variable of interest that is latent. We argue that such a setting is by far the
most common case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical
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latent variables (and general manifest variables) a condition that, if satisfied,
prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance. This condition is
shown to be easily satisfied even in the most common statistical problems.
We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against the possibility
to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems.
Acknowledgements
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3.2 Introduction
Epistemic theories of statistics are often confronted with the question of prior
ignorance. Prior ignorance means that a subject, who is about to perform a
statistical analysis, has not any substantial belief about the underlying data-
generating process. Yet, the subject would like to exploit the available sample
to draw some statistical inference, i.e., the subject would like to use the data
to learn, moving away from the initial condition of ignorance. This situation
is very important as it is often desirable to start a statistical analysis with
weak assumptions about the problem of interest, thus trying to implement
an objective-minded approach to statistics.
A fundamental question is if prior ignorance is compatible with learning.
Walley gives a negative answer for the case of his self-consistent (or coherent)
theory of statistics: he shows, in a very general sense, that vacuous prior
beliefs lead to vacuous posterior beliefs, irrespective of the type and amount of
observed data (Walley, 1991, Section 7.3.7).1 At the same time, he proposes
focusing on a slightly different state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, that
does enable learning to take place (Walley, 1991, Section 4.6.9). Loosely
speaking, a near-ignorance prior is a probability model on the chances of a
categorical random variable, modelling a state of very weak knowledge on the
chances (see Section 3.4). The fact that learning is possible under prior near-
ignorance is shown, for instance, in the special case of the imprecise Dirichlet
1We recall that Walley’s theory can be regarded, to a large extent, as providing the
foundations of robust Bayesian statistics, for which the same consideration then applies.
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model (IDM). This is a popular model, based on a near-ignorance prior, used
in the case of inference from categorical data generated by a multinomial
process (Walley (1996); Bernard (2005)).
What is important to realize, at this point, is that near-ignorance plays
a crucially unique role in the question of modeling prior ignorance; the key
point is that near-ignorance priors can be made to satisfy two principles: the
symmetry and the embedding principles. The first is well known and is related
to Laplace’s indifference principle; the second states, loosely speaking, that if
we are ignorant a priori, our beliefs on an event of interest should not depend
on the space of possibilities in which the event is embedded (see Section 3.4
for a discussion about these two principles). Walley (1991) and later De
Cooman and Miranda (2006) have argued extensively on the necessity of
both the symmetry and the embedding principles in order to characterize a
condition of ignorance.
In this paper, we investigate whether near-ignorance can be really regarded
as a possible way to model ignorance in real statistical problems. To this
extent, we focus, as in the case of the IDM, on a categorical random variable
X expressing the outcomes of a multinomial process, but, as opposed to the
IDM, we assume that such a variable is latent. This means that we cannot
observe the realizations of X, so we can learn about it only by means of
another, not necessarily categorical, variable S, related to X in some known
way. Variable S is assumed to be manifest, in the sense that its realizations
can be observed (see Section 3.3).
In such a setting, we introduce a condition in Section 3.5, related to the
likelihood of the observed data, that is shown to be sufficient to prevent
learning about X under prior near-ignorance. The condition is very general
as it is developed for any prior that models near-ignorance (not only the one
used in the IDM), and for very general kinds of relation between X and S.
We show then, by simple examples, that such a condition is easily satisfied,
even in the most elementary and common statistical problems.
In order to appreciate this result, it is important to realize that latent
variables are ubiquitous in problems of uncertainty. It can be argued, indeed,
that there is a persistent distinction between (latent) facts (e.g., health, state
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of economy, color of a ball) and (manifest) observations of facts: one can
regard them as being related by a so-called observational process ; and the
point is that these kinds of processes are imperfect in practice. Observational
processes are often neglected in statistics, when their imperfection is deemed
to be tiny. But a striking outcome of the present research is that, no matter
how tiny the imperfection, provided it exists, learning is not possible under
prior near-ignorance. This is shown in a definite sense in Example 29 of
Section 3.5.3, where we analyze the relevance of our results for the special
case of the IDM.
On our view, the present results raise serious doubts about the possibility
to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real, as opposed to idealized,
applications of statistics. As a consequence, it may make sense to consider
re-focusing the research about this subject on developing models of very
weak states of belief that are, however, stronger than near-ignorance. This
would involve dropping the idea that both the symmetry and the embedding
principles can be realistically met in practice.
3.3 Categorical Latent Variables
In this paper, we follow the general definition of latent and manifest vari-
ables given by Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004): a latent variable is a
random variable whose realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a mani-
fest variable is a random variable whose realizations can be directly observed.
The concept of latent variable is central in many sciences, like for example
psychology and medicine. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) list several
fields of application and several phenomena that can be modelled using la-
tent variables, and conclude that latent variable modeling “pervades modern
mainstream statistics,” although “this omni-presence of latent variables is
commonly not recognized, perhaps because latent variables are given different
names in different literatures, such as random effects, common factors and
latent classes,” or hidden variables.
But what are latent variables in practice? According to Boorsbom et al.
(2002), there may be different interpretations of latent variables. A latent
variable can be regarded, for example, as an unobservable random variable
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that exists independent of the observation. An example is the unobserv-
able health status of a patient that is subject to a medical test. Another
possibility is to regard a latent variable as a product of the human mind,
a construct that does not exist independent of the observation. For ex-
ample the unobservable state of the economy, often used in economic mod-
els. In this paper, we assume the existence of a latent categorical random
variable X, with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk} and unknown chances2 ϑ ∈
Θ := {ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) |
∑k
i=1 ϑi = 1, 0 ≤ ϑi ≤ 1}, without stressing any par-
ticular interpretation.
Now, let us focus on a bounded real-valued function f defined on Θ, where
ϑ ∈ Θ are the unknown chances of X. We aim at learning the value f(ϑ)
using N realizations of the variable X. Because the variable X is latent and
therefore unobservable by definition, the only way to learn f(ϑ) is to observe
the realizations of some manifest variable S related, in a known way, to the
(unobservable) realizations of X. An example of known relationship between
latent and manifest variables is the following.
Example 21 Consider a binary medical diagnostic test used to assess the
health status of a patient with respect to a given disease. The accuracy of a
diagnostic test3 is determined by two probabilities: the sensitivity of a test
is the probability of obtaining a positive result if the patient is diseased; the
specificity is the probability of obtaining a negative result if the patient is
healthy. Medical tests are assumed to be imperfect indicators of the unob-
servable true disease status of the patient. Therefore, we assume that the
probability of obtaining a positive result when the patient is healthy, respec-
tively of obtaining a negative result if the patient is diseased, are non-zero.
Suppose, to make things simpler, that the sensitivity and the specificity of
the test are known. In this example, the unobservable health status of the
patient can be considered as a binary latent variable X with values in the
set {Healthy, Ill}, while the result of the test can be considered as a binary
manifest variable S with values in the set {Negative result,Positive result}.
Because the sensitivity and the specificity of the test are known, we know
how X and S are related. ♦
2Throughout the paper, we denote with ϑ a particular vector of chances in Θ and with
θ a (random) variable on Θ.
3For further details about the modeling of diagnostic accuracy with latent variables see
Yang and Becker (1997).
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We continue discussion about this example later on, in the light of our
results, in Example 24 of Section 3.5.
3.4 Near-Ignorance Priors
Consider a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk}
and unknown chances ϑ ∈ Θ. Suppose that we have no relevant prior infor-
mation about ϑ and we are therefore in a situation of prior ignorance about
X. How should we model our prior beliefs in order to reflect the initial lack
of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models
of uncertainty, such as Bayesian probability and Walley’s theory of coherent
lower previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modelled using a sin-
gle prior probability distribution. The problem of defining a standard prior
probability distribution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called
noninformative prior, has been an important research topic in the last two
centuries4 and, despite the numerous contributions, it remains an open re-
search issue, as illustrated by Kass and Wassermann (1996). See also Hutter
(2006) for recent developments and complementary considerations. There
are many principles and properties that are desirable to model a situation of
prior ignorance and that have been used in past research to define noninfor-
mative priors. For example Laplace’s symmetry or indifference principle has
suggested, in case of finite possibility spaces, the use of the uniform distri-
bution. Other principles, like for example the principle of invariance under
group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the conjugate pri-
ors principle, etc., have suggested the use of other noninformative priors, in
particular for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or more of these
principles. But, in general, it has proven to be difficult to define a standard
noninformative prior satisfying, at the same time, all the desirable principles.
4Starting from the work of Laplace at the beginning of the 19th century (Laplace
(1820)).
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We follow De Cooman and Miranda (2006) when they say that there are
at least two principles that should be satisfied to model a situation of prior
ignorance: the symmetry and the embedding principles. The symmetry prin-
ciple states that, if we are ignorant a priori about ϑ, then we have no reason
to favour one possible outcome of X to another, and therefore our probability
model on X should be symmetric. This principle recalls Laplace’s symmetry
or indifference principle that, in the past decades, has suggested the use of
the uniform prior as standard noninformative prior. The embedding prin-
ciple states that, for each possible event A, the probability assigned to A
should not depend on the possibility space X in which A is embedded. In
particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event A should be invariant
with respect to refinements and coarsenings of X . It is easy to show that the
embedding principle is not satisfied by the uniform distribution. How should
we model our prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two principles? Walley
(1991) gives a compelling answer to this question: he proves5 that the only
coherent probability model on X consistent with the two principles is the vac-
uous probability model, i.e., the model that assigns, for each non-trivial event
A, lower probability P(A) = 0 and upper probability P(A) = 1. Clearly,
the vacuous probability model cannot be expressed using a single probability
distribution. It follows that, if we agree that the symmetry and the embed-
ding principles are characteristics of prior ignorance, then we need imprecise
probabilities to model such a state of beliefs.6 Unfortunately, it is easy to
show that updating the vacuous probability model on X produces only vac-
uous posterior probabilities. Therefore, the vacuous probability model alone
is not a viable way to address our initial problem. Walley (1991) suggests,
as an alternative, the use of near-ignorance priors.
A near-ignorance prior is a probability model on the chances θ of X, mod-
elling a very weak state of knowledge about θ. In practice, a near-ignorance
prior is a large closed convex setM0 of prior probability densities on θ which
produces vacuous expectations for various functions f on Θ, i.e., such that
E(f) = infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and E(f) = supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ). The key point is that near-
ignorance priors can be designed so as to satisfy both the symmetry and the
embedding principles. In fact, if a near-ignorance prior produces vacuous
expectations for all the functions f(θ) = θi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then,
5In Note 7, p. 526. See also Section 5.5 of the same book.
6For a complementary point of view, see Hutter (2006).
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because a priori P (X = xi) = E(θi), the near-ignorance prior implies the
vacuous probability model on X and satisfies therefore both the symmetry
and the embedding principle, thus delivering a satisfactory model of prior
(near-)ignorance.7 Updating a near-ignorance prior consists in updating all
the probability densities in M0 using the Bayes rule. Because the beliefs on
θ are not vacuous, we obtain thus a non-vacuous set of posterior probability
densities on θ that can be used to calculate posterior probabilities for X.
A good example of near-ignorance prior is the setM0 used in the imprecise
Dirichlet model (IDM). The IDM models a situation of prior ignorance about
the chances θ of a categorical random variable X. The near-ignorance prior
M0 used in the IDM consists of the set of all Dirichlet densities p(θ) =
dirs,t(θ) for a fixed s > 0 and all t ∈ T , where
dirs,t(θ) :=
Γ(s)∏k
i=1 Γ(sti)
k∏
i=1
θsti−1i , (3.1)
and
T := {t = (t1, . . . , tk) |
k∑
j=1
tj = 1, 0 < tj < 1}. (3.2)
The particular choice of M0 in the IDM implies vacuous prior expectations
for all functions f(θ) = θN
′
i , for all N
′ ≥ 1 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i.e.,
E(θN
′
i ) = 0 and E(θ
N ′
i ) = 1. Choosing N
′ = 1, we have, a priori,
P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 0, P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 1.
It follows that the particular near-ignorance prior M0 used in the IDM im-
plies a priori the vacuous probability model on X and, therefore, satisfies
both the symmetry and embedding principles. In Walley (1996), it is shown
that the IDM produces, for each observed dataset, non-vacuous posterior
probabilities for X.
3.5 Limits of Learning under Prior Near-Ignorance
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) cate-
gorical latent variables (Xi)i∈N with outcomes in X and unknown chances ϑ,
7We call this state near-ignorance because, although we are completely ignorant a priori
about X, we are not completely ignorant about θ (Walley, 1991, Section 5.3, Note 4).
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and a sequence of independent manifest variables (Si)i∈N. We assume that
a realization of the manifest variable Si can be observed only after a (hid-
den) realization of the latent variable Xi. Furthermore, we assume Si to be
independent of the chances ϑ of Xi conditional on Xi, i.e.,
P (Si |Xi = xj, ϑ) = P (Si |Xi = xj), (3.3)
for each xj ∈ X and ϑ ∈ Θ. These assumptions model what we call an
observational process, i.e., a two-step process where the variable Si is used to
acquire information about the realized value of Xi for each i, independently
on the chances of Xi. For simplicity, we assume the probability mass function
P (Si |Xi = xj) to be precise and known for each xj ∈ X and each i ∈ N.
We divide the discussion about the limits of learning under prior near-
ignorance in three subsections. In Section 3.5.1 we discuss our general para-
metric problem and we obtain a condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning
to take place. In Section 3.5.2 we study the consequences of our theoretical
results in the particular case of predictive probabilities. Finally, in Sec-
tion 3.5.3, we focus on the particular near-ignorance prior used in the IDM
and we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for learning with categorical
manifest variables.
3.5.1 General parametric inference
We focus on a very general problem of parametric inference. Suppose that
we observe a dataset s of realizations of manifest variables S1, . . . , SN re-
lated to the (unobservable) dataset x ∈ XN of realizations of the vari-
ables X1, . . . ,XN . Defining the random variables X := (X1, . . . ,XN) and
S := (S1, . . . , SN) we have S = s and X = x. To simplify notation, when no
confusion can arise, we denote in the rest of the paper S = s with s. Given a
bounded function f(θ), our aim is to calculate E(f | s) and E(f | s) starting
from a condition of ignorance about f , i.e., using a near ignorance priorM0,
such that E(f) = fmin := infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and E(f) = fmax : supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ).
Is it really possible to learn something about the function f , starting from
a condition of prior near-ignorance and having observed a dataset of manifest
variables S = s? The following theorem shows that, very often, this is not
the case. In particular, Corollary 23 shows that there is a condition that, if
satisfied, prevents learning to take place.
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Theorem 22 Let s be given. Consider a bounded continuous function f
defined on Θ. Then following statements hold.8
1. If the likelihood function P(s | θ) is strictly positive9 in each point in
which f reaches its maximum value fmax, is continuous in an arbitrary
small neighborhood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori E(f) =
fmax, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax.
2. If the likelihood function P(s | θ) is strictly positive in each point in
which f reaches its minimum value fmin, is continuous in an arbitrary
small neighborhood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori E(f) =
fmin, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin.
Corollary 23 Let s be given and let P(s | θ) be a continuous strictly positive
function on Θ. If M0 is such that E(f) = fmin and E(f) = fmax, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin,
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax.
In other words, given s, if the likelihood function is strictly positive, then the
functions f that, according to M0, have vacuous expectations a priori, have
vacuous expectations also a posteriori, after having observed s. It follows
that, if this sufficient condition is satisfied, we cannot use near-ignorance
priors to model a state of prior ignorance because only vacuous posterior ex-
pectations are produced. The sufficient condition described above is satisfied
very often in practice, as illustrated by the following striking examples.
Example 24 Consider the medical test introduced in Example 21 and an
(ideally) infinite population of individuals. Denote with the binary variable
Xi ∈ {H, I} the health status of the i-th individual of the population and
8The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix, together with all the other proofs
of the paper.
9In the appendix it is shown that the assumptions of positivity of P(s | θ) in Theorem 22
can be substituted by the following weaker assumptions. For a given arbitrary small δ > 0,
denote with Θδ the measurable set, Θδ := {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≥ fmax − δ}. If P(s | θ) is such
that, limδ→0 infϑ∈Θδ P(s |ϑ) = c > 0, then Statement 1 of Theorem 22 holds. The same
holds for the second statement, substituting Θδ with Θ˜δ := {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≤ fmin + δ}.
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with Si ∈ {+,−} the results of the diagnostic test applied to the same
individual. We assume that the variables in the sequence (Xi)i∈N are IID
with unknown chances (ϑ, 1 − ϑ), where ϑ corresponds to the (unknown)
proportion of diseased individuals in the population. Denote with 1− ε1 the
specificity and with 1− ε2 the sensitivity of the test. Then it holds that
P(Si = + |Xi = H) = ε1 > 0, P(Si = − |Xi = I) = ε2 > 0,
where (I,H,+,−) denote (patient ill, patient healthy, test positive, test neg-
ative).
Suppose that we observe the results of the test applied to N different
individuals of the population; using our previous notation we have S = s.
For each individual we have,
P(Si = + |ϑ) =
=P(Si = + |Xi = I)P(Xi = I |ϑ) + P(Si = + |Xi = H)P(Xi = H |ϑ) =
= (1− ε2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·ϑ+ ε1︸︷︷︸
>0
·(1− ϑ) > 0.
Analogously,
P(Si = − |ϑ) =
=P(Si = − |Xi = I)P(Xi = I |ϑ) + P(Si = − |Xi = H)P(Xi = H |ϑ) =
= ε2︸︷︷︸
>0
·ϑ+ (1− ε1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(1− ϑ) > 0.
Denote with ns the number of positive tests in the observed sample s. Then,
because the variables Si are independent, we have
P(S = s |ϑ) = ((1− ε2) · ϑ+ ε1 · (1− ϑ))ns · (ε2 · ϑ+ (1− ε1) · (1− ϑ))N−ns > 0
for each ϑ ∈ [0, 1] and each s ∈ XN . Therefore, according to Corollary 23,
all the functions f that, according toM0, have vacuous expectations a priori
have vacuous expectations also a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to
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avoid vacuous posterior expectations, then we cannot model our prior knowl-
edge (ignorance) using a near-ignorance prior. This simple example shows
that our previous theoretical results raise serious questions about the use of
near-ignorance priors also in very simple, common, and important situations.
The situation presented in this example can be extended, in a straightfor-
ward way, to a more general categorical case and has been studied, in the
special case of the near-ignorance prior used in the imprecise Dirichlet model,
in Piatti et al. (2005). ♦
Example 24 focuses on categorical latent and manifest variables. In the
next example, we show that our theoretical results have important implica-
tions also in models with categorical latent variables and continuous manifest
variables.
Example 25 Consider a sequence of IID categorical variables (Xi)i∈N with
outcomes in XN and unknown chances ϑ ∈ Θ. Suppose that, for each i ≥ 1,
after a realization of the latent variable Xi, we can observe a realization of a
continuous manifest variable Si. Assume that p(Si |Xi = xj) is a continuous
positive probability density, e.g., a normal N(µj, σ
2
j ) density, for each xj ∈ X .
We have
p(Si |ϑ) =
∑
xj∈XN
p(Si |Xi = xj) · P(Xi = xj |ϑ) =
∑
xj∈XN
p(Si |Xi = xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·ϑj > 0,
because ϑj is positive for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and we have assumed
Si to be independent of θ given Xi. Because we have assumed (Si)i∈N to be
a sequence of independent variables, we have
p(S = s |ϑ) =
N∏
i=1
p(Si = si |ϑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Therefore, according to Corollary 23, if we model our prior knowledge using
a near-ignorance prior M0, the vacuous prior expectations implied by M0
remain vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous
posterior expectations, we cannot model our prior knowledge using a near-
ignorance prior. ♦
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Examples 24 and 25 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use of
near-ignorance priors in real applications.
3.5.2 An important special case: predictive probabili-
ties
We focus now on a particular and very important particular case: the case
of predictive inference.10 Suppose that our aim is to predict the outcomes of
the next N ′ variables XN+1, . . . ,XN+N ′ . Let X′ := (XN+1, . . . ,XN+N ′). If no
confusion is possible, we denote X′ = x′ by x′. Given x′ ∈ XN ′ , our aim is
to calculate P(x′ | s) and P(x′ | s).
Modelling our prior ignorance about the parameters θ with a near-ignorance
prior M0 and denoting by n′ := (n′1, . . . , n′k) the frequencies of the dataset
x′, we have
P(x′ | s) = inf
p∈M0
Pp(x
′ | s) = inf
p∈M0
∫
Θ
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i p(θ | s)dθ =
= inf
p∈M0
Ep
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
= E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
,
(3.4)
where, according to Bayes rule,
p(θ | s) = P(s | θ)p(θ)∫
Θ
P(s | θ)p(θ)dθ ,
provided that
∫
Θ
P(s | θ)p(θ)dθ 6= 0. Analogously, substituting sup to inf in
(3.4), we obtain
P(x′ | s) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
. (3.5)
Therefore, the lower and upper probabilities assigned to the dataset x′ a
priori (a posteriori) correspond to the prior (posterior) lower and upper ex-
pectations of the continuous bounded function f(θ) =
∏k
i=1 θ
n′i
i .
10For a general presentation of predictive inference see Geisser (1993); for a discussion of
the imprecise probability approach to predictive inference see Walley and Bernard (1999)
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It is easy to show that, in this case, the minimum of f is 0 and is reached
in all the points ϑ ∈ Θ with ϑi = 0 for some i such that n′i > 0, while the
maximum of f is reached in a single point of Θ corresponding to the relative
frequencies f ′ of the sample x′, i.e., at f ′ =
(
n′1
N ′ , . . . ,
n′k
N ′
)
∈ Θ, and the
maximum of f is given by
∏k
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
. It follows that vacuous probabilities
regarding the dataset x′ are given by
P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
= 0, P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
=
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
.
The general results stated in Section 3.5.1 hold also in the particular case
of predictive probabilities. In particular, Corollary 23 can be rewritten as
follows.
Corollary 26 Let s be given and let P(s | θ) be a continuous strictly positive
function on Θ. Then, if M0 implies vacuous prior probabilities for a dataset
x′ ∈ XN ′, the predictive probabilities of x′ are vacuous also a posteriori, after
having observed s, i.e.,
P(x′ | s) = P(x′) = 0, P(x′ | s) = P(x′) =
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
.
3.5.3 Predicting the next outcome with categorical man-
ifest variables
In this section we consider a special case for which we give necessary and
sufficient conditions to learn under prior near-ignorance. These conditions
are then used to analyze the IDM.
We assume that all the manifest variables in S are categorical. Given
an arbitrary categorical manifest variable Si, denote with S i = {s1, . . . , sni}
the finite set of possible outcomes of Si. The probabilities of Si are defined
conditional on the realized value of Xi and are given by
λSihj := P (Si = sh |Xi = xj),
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where h ∈ {1, . . . , ni} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The probabilities of Si can be
collected in a ni × k stochastic matrix ΛSi defined by
ΛSi :=
 λ
Si
11 . . . λ
Si
1k
...
. . .
...
λSi
ni1
. . . λSi
nik
 ,
which is called emission matrix of Si.
Our aim, given s, is to predict the next (latent) outcome starting from
prior near-ignorance. In other words, our aim is to calculate P(XN+1 = xj | s)
and P(XN+1 = xj | s) for each xj ∈ X , using a set of priors M0 such that
P(XN+1 = xj) = 0 and P(XN+1 = xj) = 1 for each xi ∈ X .
A possible near-ignorance prior for this problem is the setM0 used in the
IDM. We have seen, in Section 3.4, that this particular near-ignorance prior
is such that P(XN+1 = xj) = 0 and P(XN+1 = xj) = 1 for each xi ∈ X . For
this particular choice, the following theorem11 states necessary and sufficient
conditions for learning.
Theorem 27 Let ΛSi be the emission matrix of Si for i = 1, . . . , N . LetM0
be the near-ignorance prior used in the IDM. Given an arbitrary observed
dataset s, we obtain a posteriori the following inferences.
1. If all the elements of matrices ΛSi are nonzero, then, P (XN+1 = xj | s) =
1, P (XN+1 = xj | s) = 0, for every xj ∈ X .
2. P (XN+1 = xj | s) < 1 for some xj ∈ X , iff we observed at least one
manifest variable Si = sh such that λ
Si
hj = 0.
3. P (XN+1 = xj | s) > 0 for some xj ∈ X , iff we observed at least one
manifest variable Si = sh such that λ
Si
hj 6= 0 and λSihr = 0 for each r 6= j
in {1, . . . , k}.
In other words, to avoid vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next
outcome, we need at least a partial perfection of the observational process.
Some simple criteria to recognize settings producing vacuous inferences are
the following.
11Theorem 27 is a slightly extended version of Theorem 1 in Piatti et al. (2005).
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Corollary 28 Under the assumptions of Theorem 27, the following criteria
hold:
1. If the j-th columns of matrices ΛSi have all nonzero elements, then, for
each s, P (XN+1 = xj | s) = 1.
2. If the j-th rows of matrices ΛSi have more than one nonzero element,
then, for each s, P (XN+1 = xj | s) = 0.
Example 29 Consider again the medical test of Example 24. The manifest
variable Si (the result of the medical test applied to the i-th individual) is a
binary variable with outcomes positive (+) or negative (−). The underlying
latent variable Xi (the health status of the i-th individual) is also a binary
variable, with outcomes ill (I) or healthy (H). The emission matrix in this
case is the same for each i ∈ N and is the 2× 2 matrix,
Λ =
(
1− ε2 ε1
ε2 1− ε1
)
.
All the elements of Λ are different from zero. Therefore, using as set of
priors the near-ignorance prior M0 of the IDM, according to Theorem 27,
we are unable to move away from the initial state of ignorance. This result
confirms, in the case of the near-ignorance prior of the IDM, the general
result of Example 24.
It is interesting to remark that it is impossible to learn for arbitrarily
small values of ε1 and ε2, provided that they are positive. It follows that
there are situations where the observational process cannot be neglected,
even when we deem it to be imperfect with tiny probability.
♦
The previous example has been concerned with the case in which the
IDM is applied to a latent categorical variable. Now we focus on the original
setup for which the IDM was conceived, where there are no latent variables.
In this case, it is well known that the IDM leads to to non-vacuous posterior
predictive probabilities for the next outcome. In the next example, we show
how such a setup makes the IDM avoid the theoretical limitations stated in
Section 3.5.1.
Example 30 In the IDM, we assume that the IID categorical variables
(Xi)i∈N are observable. In other words, we have Si = Xi for each i ≥ 1
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and therefore the IDM is not a latent variable model. The IDM is equiv-
alent to a model with categorical manifest variables and emission matrices
equal to the identity matrix I. Therefore, according to the second and third
statements of Theorem 27, if x contains only observations of the type xj,
then
P(XN+1 = xj) > 0 ,P(XN+1 = xj) = 1 ,P(XN+1 = xh) = 0 ,P(XN+1 = xh) < 1,
for each h 6= j. Otherwise, for all the other possible observed dataset x,
P(XN+1 = xj) > 0 ,P(XN+1 = xj) < 1 ,P(XN+1 = xh) > 0 ,P(XN+1 = xh) < 1.
It follows that, in general, the IDM produces, for each observed dataset x,
non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next outcome.
The IDM avoids the theoretical limitations highlighted in Section 3.5.1
thanks to its particular likelihood function. Having observed S = X = x, we
have
P(S = x | θ) = P(X = x | θ) =
k∏
i=1
θnii ,
where ni denotes the number of times that xi ∈ X has been observed in x.
We have P(X = x |ϑ) = 0 for all ϑ such that ϑj = 0 for at least one j such
that nj > 0 and P(X = x |ϑ) > 0 for all the other ϑ ∈ Θ, in particular for
all ϑ in the interior of Θ.
Consider, to make things simpler, that in x at least two different out-
comes have been observed. The posterior predictive probabilities for the
next outcome are obtained calculating the lower and upper expectations of
the function f(θ) = θj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This function reaches its mini-
mum (fmin = 0) if θj = 0 and its maximum (fmin = 1) if θj = 1. Therefore,
the points where the function f(θ) = θj reaches its minimum, resp. its
maximum, are on the boundary of Θ and it is easy to show that the likeli-
hood function equals zero at least in one of these points. It follows that the
positivity assumptions of Theorem 22 are not met. ♦
Example 30 shows that we are able to learn, using a near-ignorance prior,
only if the likelihood function P(s | θ) is equal to zero in some critical points.
The likelihood function of the IDM is very peculiar, being in general equal
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to zero on some parts of the boundary of Θ, and allows therefore to use a
near-ignorance prior M0 that models in a satisfactory way a condition of
prior (near-)ignorance.12
Yet, since the variables (Xi)i∈N are assumed to be observable, the suc-
cessful application of a near-ignorance prior in the IDM is not helpful in
addressing the doubts raised by our theoretical results about the applica-
bility of near-ignorance priors in situations, where the variables (Xi)i∈N are
latent, as shown in Example 29.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proved a sufficient condition that prevents learning
about a latent categorical variable to take place under prior near-ignorance
regarding the data-generating process.
The condition holds as soon as the likelihood is strictly positive (and con-
tinuous), and so is satisfied frequently, even in the simplest settings. Taking
into account that the considered framework is very general and pervasive of
statistical practice, we regard this result as a form of strong evidence against
the possibility to use prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems.
As a consequence, we suggest that future research efforts should be directed
to study and develop new forms of knowledge that are close to near-ignorance
but that do not coincide with it. This might involve modifying the symmetry
and the embedding principles so as to capture a notion of quasi-ignorance
that can be effectively implemented in real statistical problems.
3.7 Technical preliminaries
In this appendix we prove some technical results that are used to prove the
theorems in the paper. First of all, we introduce some notation used in
12See Walley (1996) and Bernard (2005) for a more detailed discussion on the theoretical
properties of the IDM.
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this appendix. Consider a sequence of probability densities (pn)n∈N and a
function f defined on a set Θ. Then, we use the notation,
En(f) :=
∫
Θ
f(θ)pn(θ)dθ, Pn(Θ˜) :=
∫
eΘ pn(θ)dθ, Θ˜ ⊆ Θ,
and with → we denote limn→∞.
Theorem 31 Let Θ ⊂ Rk be the closed k-dimensional simplex and let (pn)n∈N
be a sequence of probability densities defined on Θ w.r.t. the Lebesgue mea-
sure. Let f ≥ 0 be a bounded continuous function on Θ and denote with fmax
the Supremum of f on Θ and with fmin the Infimum of f on Θ. For this
function define the measurable sets
Θδ = {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≥ fmax − δ}, (3.6)
Θ˜δ = {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≤ fmin + δ}. (3.7)
1. Assume that (pn)n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n→∞, in
the sense that
En(f)→ fmax, (3.8)
then, for all δ > 0, it holds
Pn(Θδ)→ 1.
2. Assume that (pn)n∈N concentrates on a minimum of f for n → ∞, in
the sense that
En(f)→ fmin, (3.9)
then, for all δ > 0, it holds
Pn(Θ˜δ)→ 1.
Proof. We begin by proving the first statement. Let δ > 0 be arbitrary and
Θ¯δ := Θ \Θδ. From (3.6) we know that on Θδ it holds f(θ) ≥ fmax − δ, and
therefore on Θ¯δ we have f(θ) ≤ fmax − δ, and thus
fmax − f(θ)
δ
≥ 1. (3.10)
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It follows that
1− Pn(Θδ) = Pn(Θ¯δ) =
∫
Θ¯δ
pn(θ)dθ
(3.10)
≤
∫
Θ¯δ
fmax − f(θ)
δ
pn(θ)dθ
≤
∫
Θ
fmax − f(θ)
δ
pn(θ)dθ =
1
δ
(fmax − En(f)) (3.9)−→ 0,
and therefore Pn(Θδ) → 1 and thus the first statement is proved. To prove
the second statement, let δ > 0 be arbitrary and Θ̂δ := Θ \ Θ˜δ. From (3.7)
we know that on Θ˜δ it holds f(θ) ≤ fmin + δ, and therefore on Θ̂δ we have
f(θ) ≥ fmin + δ, and thus
f(θ)− fmin
δ
≥ 1. (3.11)
It follows that
1− Pn(Θ˜δ) = Pn(Θ̂δ) =
∫
bΘδ pn(θ)dθ
(3.11)
≤
∫
bΘδ
f(θ)− fmin
δ
pn(θ)dθ
≤
∫
Θ
f(θ)− fmin
δ
pn(θ)dθ =
1
δ
(En(f)− fmin) (3.9)−→ 0,
and therefore Pn(Θ˜δ)→ 1.
Theorem 32 Let L(θ) ≥ 0 be a bounded measurable function and suppose
that the Assumptions of Theorem 31 hold. Then the following two statements
hold.
1. If the function L(θ) is such that
lim
δ→0
inf
θ∈Θδ
L(θ) =: c > 0, (3.12)
and (pn)n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n→∞, then
En(Lf)
En(L)
=
∫
Θ
f(θ)L(θ)pn(θ)dθ∫
Θ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
→ fmax. (3.13)
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2. If the function L(θ) is such that
lim
δ→0
inf
θ∈eΘδ L(θ) =: c > 0, (3.14)
and (pn)n∈N concentrates on a minimum of f for n→∞, then
En(Lf)
En(L)
−→ fmin. (3.15)
Remark 33 If L is strictly positive in each point in Θ where the function
f reaches its maximum, resp. minimum, and is continuous in an arbitrary
small neighborhood of those points, then (3.12), resp. (3.14), are satisfied.
Proof. We begin by proving the first statement of the theorem. Fix ε and
δ arbitrarily small, but δ small enough such that infϑ∈Θδ L(ϑ) ≥ c2 . Denote
with Lmax the supremum of the function L(θ) in Θ. From Theorem 31,
we know that Pn(Θδ) ≥ 1 − ε, for n sufficiently large. This implies, for n
sufficiently large,
En(L) =
∫
Θ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ ≥
∫
Θδ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ ≥ c
2
(1− ε), (3.16)
En(Lf) ≤ En(Lfmax) = fmaxEn(L), (3.17)
En(L) =
∫
Θ¯δ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ +
∫
Θδ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
≤ Lmax
∫
Θ¯δ
pn(θ)dθ +
∫
Θδ
f(θ)
fmax − δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1 onΘδ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
≤ Lmax · ε+ 1
fmax − δEn(Lf). (3.18)
Combining (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18), we have
fmax ≥ En(Lf)
En(L)
≥ (fmax − δ)En(L)− Lmax · ε
En(L)
≥ (fmax − δ)
(
1− Lmax · εc
2
(1− ε)
)
.
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Since the right hand side of the last inequality tends to fmax for δ, ε → 0,
and both δ, ε can be chosen arbitrarily small, we have
En(Lf)
En(L)
→ fmax.
To prove the second statement of the theorem, fix ε and δ arbitrarily small,
but δ small enough such that infϑ∈eΘδ L(ϑ) ≥ c2 . From Theorem 31, we know
that Pn(Θ˜δ) ≥ 1− ε, for n sufficiently large and therefore Pn(Θ̂δ) ≤ ε. This
implies, for n sufficiently large,
En(L) =
∫
Θ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ ≥
∫
eΘδ L(θ)pn(θ)dθ ≥
c
2
(1− ε), (3.19)
En(Lf) ≥ En(Lfmin) = fminEn(L)⇒ fmin ≤ En(Lf)
En(L)
. (3.20)
Define the function
K(θ) :=
(
1− f(θ)
fmin + δ
)
L(θ).
By definition, the function K is negative on Θ̂δ and is bounded. Denote with
Kmin the (negative) minimum of K. We have
En(L) =
∫
bΘδ L(θ)pn(θ)dθ +
∫
eΘδ L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
≥
∫
bΘδ L(θ)pn(θ)dθ +
∫
eΘδ
f(θ)
fmin + δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1 on eΘδ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
=
∫
bΘδ
(
L(θ)− f(θ)
fmin + δ
L(θ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K(θ)
pn(θ)dθ +
1
fmin + δ
∫
Θ
f(θ)L(θ)pn(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=En(Lf)
≥ Kmin · Pn(Θ̂δ) + 1
fmin + δ
· En(Lf).
It follows that(
En(L)−Kmin · Pn(Θ̂δ)
)
(fmin + δ) ≥ En(Lf),
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and thus, combining the last inequality with (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain
fmin ≤ En(Lf)
En(L)
≤ (fmin + δ)
(
1 +
|Kmin| · Pn(Θ̂δ)
En(L)
)
≤ (fmin + δ)
(
1 +
|Kmin| · ε
c
2
(1− ε)
)
.
Since the right hand side of the last inequality tends to fmin for δ, ε→ 0, and
both δ, ε can be chosen arbitrarily small, we have
En(Lf)
En(L)
→ fmin.
3.8 Proofs of the main results
3.8.1 Proof of Theorem 22 and Corollary 23
Define, fmin := infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ), fmax := supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ), and define the bounded
non-negative function f˜(θ) := f(θ)− fmin ≥ 0. We have, f˜max = fmax− fmin.
IfM0 is such that a priori, E(f) = fmax, then we have also that E(f˜) = f˜max,
because,
E(f˜) = sup
p∈M0
Ep(f−fmin) = sup
p∈M0
Ep(f)−fmin = E(f)−fmin = fmax−fmin = f˜max.
Then, it is possible to define a sequence (pn)n∈N ⊂ M0 such that En(f˜) →
f˜max. According to Theorem 32, substituting L(θ) with P(s | θ) in (3.13), we
see that En(f˜ | s)→ f˜max = E(f˜) and therefore E(f˜ | s) = E(f˜), from which
follows that,
E(f | s)− fmin = E(f)− fmin = fmax − fmin.
We can conclude that, E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax. In the same way, substituting
E to E, we can prove that E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin.
Corollary 23 is a direct consequence of Theorem 22.
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3.8.2 Proof of Theorem 27 and Corollary 28
To prove Theorem 27 we need following lemma.
Lemma 34 Consider a dataset x with frequencies a = (ax1 , . . . , a
x
k). Then,
the following equality holds,
k∏
h=1
θ
axh
h · dirs,t(θ) =
∏k
h=1 ·
∏axh
j=1(sth + j − 1)∏N
j=1(s+ j − 1)
· dirsx,tx(θ),
where sx := N+s and txh :=
axh+sth
N+s
. When axh = 0, we set
∏0
j=1(sth+j−1) :=
1 by definition.
A proof of Lemma 34 is in Piatti et al. (2005). Because P(x | θ) =∏kh=1 θaxhh ,
according to Bayes rule, we have p(θ |x) = dirsx,tx(θ) and
P (x) =
∏k
h=1
∏axh
l=1(sth + l − 1)∏N
l=1(s+ l − 1)
. (3.21)
Given a Dirichlet distribution dirs,t(θ), the expected value E(θj) is given by
E(θj) = tj (see Kotz et al. (2000)). It follows that
E(θj |x) = txj =
axj + stj
N + s
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 27.
1. The first statement of Theorem 27 is a consequence of Corollary 26.
Because Si is independent of θ given Xi for each i ∈ N, we have
P(s |x, θ) = P(s |x), (3.22)
and therefore, using (3.22) and Bayes rule, we obtain the likelihood
function,
L(θ) = P (s | θ) =
∑
x∈XN
P (s |x) · P (x | θ) =
∑
x∈XN
P (s |x) ·
k∏
h=1
θ
axh
h .
(3.23)
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Because all the elements of the matrices ΛSi are nonzero, we have
P (s |x) > 0, for each s and each x ∈ XN . For each ϑ ∈ Θ, there
is at least one x ∈ XN such that ∏kh=1 ϑaxhh > 0. It follows that,
L(ϑ) =
∑
x∈XN
P (s |x) ·
k∏
j=1
ϑ
axj
j > 0,
for each ϑ ∈ Θ and therefore, according to Corollary 26 with N ′ = 1,
the predictive probabilities that are vacuous a priori remain vacuous
also a posteriori.
2. We have P(XN+1 = xj | s) = E(θj | s), and therefore, according to
Lemma 34 and Bayes rule,
P (XN+1 = xj | s) =
∫
Θ
θjP (s | θ)p(θ)dθ∫
Θ
P (s | θ)p(θ)dθ =
(3.22)
=
∑
x∈XN
∫
Θ
θjP (s |x)P (x | θ)p(θ)dθ∑
x∈XN
∫
Θ
P (s |x)P (x | θ)p(θ)dθ =
=
∑
x∈XN P (s |x)P (x)
∫
Θ
θjp(θ |x)dθ∑
x∈XN P (s |x)P (x)
=
=
∑
x∈XN
(
P (s |x)P (x)∑
x∈XN P (s |x)P (x)
)
· E(θj |x),
=
∑
x∈XN
(
P (s |x)P (x)∑
x∈XN P (s |x)P (x)
)
· a
x
j + stj
N + s
.(3.24)
(3.24) is a convex sum of fractions and is therefore a continuous function
of t on T . Denote with xj the dataset of length N composed only by
outcomes xj, i.e., the dataset with a
xj
j = N and a
xj
h = 0 for each h 6= j.
For all x 6= xj we have
axj + stj
N + s
≤ N − 1 + stj
N + s
≤ N − 1 + s
N + s
< 1,
on T (the closure of T ), only xj has
sup
t∈T
ax
j
j + stj
N + s
= sup
t∈T
N + stj
N + s
= 1.
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A convex sum of fractions smaller than or equal to one is equal to one,
only if the weights associated to fractions smaller than one are all equal
to zero and there are some positive weights associated to fractions equal
to one. If P (s |xj) = 0, then (3.24) is a convex combination of fractions
strictly smaller than 1 on T and therefore P (XN+1 = xj | s) < 1. If
P (s |xj) 6= 0, then letting tj → 1, and consequently th → 0 for all
h 6= j, according to (3.21), we have P (xj) → 1 and P (x) → 0 for all
x 6= xj, and thus, using (3.24),
1 ≥ P (XN+1 = xj | s) ≥ lim
tj→1
P (XN+1 = xj | s) =
P (s |xj)P (xj)N+s
N+s
P (s |xj)P (xj) = 1.
If we have observed a manifest variable Si = sh with λ
St
hj = 0, it means
that the observation excludes the possibility that the underlying value
of Xi is xj, therefore P (s |xj) = 0 and thus
P (XN+1 = xj | s) < 1.
On the other hand, if P (XN+1 = xj | s) < 1, it must hold that P (s |xj) =
0, i.e., that we have observed a realization of a manifest that is incom-
patible with the underlying (latent) outcome xj. But a realization of
a manifest that is incompatible with the underlying (latent) outcome
only if the observed manifest variable was Si = sh with λ
Si
hj = 0.
3. Having observed a manifest variable Si = sh, such that λ
Si
hj 6= 0 and
λSihr = 0 for each r 6= j in {1, . . . , k}, we are sure that the underlying
value of Xi is xj. Therefore, P (s |x) = 0 for all x with axj = 0. It
follows from (3.24) that
P (XN+1 = xj | s) =
∑
x∈XN , axj>0 P (s |x)P (x) ·
axj+stj
N+s∑
x∈XN , axj>0 P (s |x)P (x)
,
which is a convex combination of terms
axj + stj
N + s
≥ a
x
j
N + s
≥ 1
N + s
,
and is therefore greater than zero for each t ∈ T . It follows that
P (XN+1 = xj | s) ≥ 1
N + s
> 0.
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On the other hand, if we do not observe a signal as described above,
it exists surely at least one x with axj = 0 and P (s |x) > 0. In this
case, using (3.24) and letting tj → 0, we have, because of (3.21), that
P (x)→ 0 for all x with axj > 0. It follows that
lim
tj→0
P (X = xj | s) = lim
tj→0
∑
x∈XN , axj=0 P (s |x)P (x) ·
axj+stj
N+s∑
x∈XN , axj=0 P (s |x)P (x)
.
Assume for simplicity that, for all h 6= j, th 6→ 0, then P (x) > 0 for all
x with axj = 0 and P (x) 6→ 0. Because, with axj = 0, we have
lim
tj→0
axj + stj
N + s
= lim
tj→0
0 + sti
N + s
= 0,
we obtain directly,
0 ≤ P (XN+1 = xj | s) = inf
t∈T
P (XN+1 = xj | s) ≤ lim
tj→0
P (XN+1 = xj | s) = 0.
Corollary 28 is a direct consequence of Theorem 27.
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Chapter 4
Learning from quasi perfect
observations under prior
near-ignorance: the binary case
4.1 Summary
History
The condition of Quasi Perfection, that is the starting point of the present
chapter, was defined in March 2006. A first version of the paper was sub-
mitted in June 2006, as Piatti et al. (2006b). The paper is currently under
revision.
Abstract
The imprecise Beta model (IBM) of Bernard (1996) and Walley (1996) is
the most popular model for learning about a binary random variable under
prior near-ignorance. Piatti et al. (2005) show that there is a fundamental
issue with the interpretation of results produced by the IBM in applications.
When the possibility that data may contain errors can be excluded, the
IBM is able to learn from each sequence of observations of the variable of
interest. However, in the more realistic case in which observations may be
affected by errors, the IBM is unable to learn. In this paper, we propose
a modified approach that allows learning from imperfect observations under
a weak specification of prior knowledge if the probability of error is small.
62
The approach is based on an additional assumption that seems natural and
acceptable in applications with moderate probabilities of observation errors.
We show that the results produced by the modified model are arbitrarily close
to those produced by the IBM, when the probability of observation errors is
smaller than a pre-specified threshold that depends on the desired accuracy
level. This last finding yields a possible explanation for the usefulness of
the IBM in applications characterized by a small probability of observation
errors.
Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the Swiss NSF programme NCCR
FINRISK, by the Swiss NSF grant 100012-105745/1 (Fabio Trojani) and by
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4.2 Introduction
Modelling prior ignorance is a fundamental issue in Bayesian statistics and
its generalizations to robust statistics or imprecise probabilities.1 Walley
(1996) has proposed an appealing model of prior ignorance, which has been
implemented in one of the most popular imprecise-probability models: the
imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM).2 In the IDM, prior ignorance about the
chances3 of a categorical random variable is modelled by a set of prior proba-
bility densities. These prior densities imply vacuous predictive probabilities,
i.e., the probabilities of the underlying categorical variable are only known to
be between 0 and 1. After having observed a sequence of realizations of the
variable of interest, the prior densities are updated using Bayes rule to ob-
tain a set of posterior probability densities that imply non-vacuous posterior
probabilities for the underlying random variable.
In this paper, we focus on the two-dimensional version of the IDM, the
imprecise Beta model (IBM) (Bernard (1996) and Walley (1996)). As the
IDM, the IBM assumes that data are perfectly observed. This assumption
is unrealistic for many applications. Piatti et al. (2005) have relaxed the
1See Walley (1991) for a comprehensive introduction to this topic.
2Bernard (2005) provides a detailed overview of the IDM.
3We call chances the physical probabilities of a random variable and we call probabilities
the epistemic probabilities.
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assumption of perfect observations and considered the IBM in a setting of
imperfect observations. They show that, in such a relaxed framework, vacu-
ous posterior probabilities arise irrespective of the amount of available data.
This feature prevents the IBM to learn from the data. Piatti et al. (2006a)
have extended that result by showing that learning is impossible as soon as
prior near-ignorance and imperfect observations arise jointly. This incompat-
ibility is mainly due to the presence of extreme priors, arbitrarily close to the
degenerate ones, in any set of prior densities specified according to Walley
(1996). To learn from imperfect observations under a weak specification of
prior knowledge, it is therefore necessary to modify the IBM by some addi-
tional assumption which restricts the set of priors, to drop those arbitrarily
near to the degenerate ones.
This paper studies a modification of the IBM, the modified IBM (MIBM),
for the case in which the probability ε of observation errors is small. In
Section 4.4 we propose an additional assumption for the IBM, called quasi
perfection (QP), which seems natural and acceptable when ε is small. We
show that Assumption (QP) is incompatible with near-degenerate priors and
leads to a restriction of the set of prior densities. The severity of the re-
striction depends on the strength of Assumption (QP) and the probability
of error ε. The approach resulting from the addition of Assumption (QP) to
the IBM enables to learn from imperfect observations under a specification
of prior knowledge which can be, depending on the size of ε, arbitrarily weak,
although never compatible with the definition of prior ignorance.
To study the relation between the MIBM and the IBM, we compare in
Section 4.5 the results produced by these two settings. We first show that the
difference between the posterior probabilities of the two models is bounded in
a way that depends only on the strength of Assumption (QP) and the size of
the data set. Moreover, given an arbitrary small tolerance δ > 0, there exists
a maximum probability of error εmax such that the distance between the
prior, the posterior and the lower and upper probabilities produced by the
two models is bounded by δ. This last finding offers a possible explanation
for the usefulness of the IBM in applications when the probability of error is
small.
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4.3 The imprecise Beta model for imperfect
observations
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) bi-
nary random variables X1, . . . ,XN+1, for N ≥ 1, taking values in the set
X = {x1, . . . , xk}. We assume that Xi is unobservable for each i = 1, . . . , N .
If Xi is realized, then a random variable Oi with values in X is observed,
such that
P (Oi = x |Xi = x) = P (Oi = x |Xi = x) = ε,
for each i = 1, . . . , N . In this setting, Xi represents the ideal realized value
of a binary variable and Oi its observed value. If ε = 0, then Oi = Xi almost
surely and the observations are called perfect. If ε > 0, Oi can be different
from Xi, and the observations are called imperfect.
Define the random variables X := (X1, . . . ,XN) and O := (O1, . . . ,ON).
For simplicity, we re-label by X the random variable of interest XN+1. Sup-
pose that X is realized with a corresponding observation O. Our aim is to
calculate the posterior predictive probability
P (X = x |O = o),
starting from a condition of near-ignorance a priori.
To model prior near-ignorance, we extend the Imprecise Beta Model (IBM)
(Bernard (1996) and Walley (1996)) to our partial information setting. In
this context, the relevant prior densities are beta densities parameterized by
a parameter t ∈]0, 1[. For any given t ∈]0, 1[ it is possible to calculate the
desired predictive probabilities using the formula:4
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
(
P (O = o |X = x)Pt(X = x)∑
y∈XN P (O = o |X = y)Pt(X = y)
)
· a
x + st
N + s
,
(4.1)
with5
Pt(X = x) =
∏ax
i=1(st+ i− 1)
∏N−ax
j=1 (s(1− t) + j − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
, (4.2)
4See Piatti et al. (2005) for a formal derivation of equation (4.1).
5For ax = 0, we set
∏0
i=1(st+ i−1) = 1, by definition. For ax = N , we set
∏0
j=1(s(1−
t) + j − 1) = 1, by definition.
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and
P (O = o |X = x) = εn · (1− ε)N−n, (4.3)
where ax is the number of outcomes equal to x in the data set x, n is
the number of wrong observations in o with respect to x and s > 0 is the
hyperparameter of the IBM. In this setting, the parameter t is the probability
assigned a priori to the outcome x.
The function Pt(X = x |O = o) has the following important property,
which allows us to compute easily lower and upper probabilities with respect
to t.
Theorem 35 For each o ∈ XN and ε > 0, the function Pt(X = x |O = o)
is strictly increasing in t .
The proof of Theorem 35 and all the other proofs of this paper are in Section
4.7 and Section 4.8. From Theorem 35, it follows that
P (X = x |O = o) := sup
t∈ ]0,1[
Pt(X = x |O = o) = lim
t→1
Pt(X = x |O = o),
P (X = x |O = o) := inf
t∈ ]0,1[
Pt(X = x |O = o) = lim
t→0
Pt(X = x |O = o).
But, in Piatti et al. (2005), we have shown that for each ε > 0 and o ∈ XN
it follows
P (X = x |O = o) = lim
t→0
Pt(X = x |O = o) = 0,
P (X = x |O = o) = lim
t→1
Pt(X = x |O = o) = 1.
Therefore, the direct extension of the IBM to a setting with imperfect obser-
vations does not lead to useful results: if there is a positive probability ε of
an observation error the extension produces only vacuous probabilities.
As shown in Piatti et al. (2006a), the inability to learn from imperfect
observations is not due to the particular structure of the set of prior densi-
ties in the IBM, but is a more general incompatibility between the definition
of prior near-ignorance and the existence of imperfect observations. This
incompatibility is mainly due to the presence of prior densities that are arbi-
trarily close to the deterministic degenerate ones in any set of prior densities
specified according to Walley (1996). In the IBM, these degenerate priors
correspond to values of t very close to 0 or 1. In order to learn from imperfect
observations, it would be therefore enough to restrict slightly the admissible
values of t. This task can be achieved by introducing some weak assumption
which restricts the prior near-ignorance in a way that avoids quasi degenerate
prior densities.
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4.4 Quasi perfect observations
Given an observed data set o, we say that o was observed quasi perfectly if,
P (X = o |O = o) ≥ K · P (X 6= o |O = o), (QP)
for some K > 1, where K represents the strength of the assumption (QP).
A person that assumes (QP) puts a higher conditional likelihood on the
hypothesis that the observed data set o is free from observation errors, with
respect to the alternative of the existence of observation errors. We refer to
Assumption (QP) as the assumption of quasi perfection. This assumption
seems appropriate for applications in which the probability of observation
errors ε is very small. However, one has to be careful in interpreting (QP)
as an assumption only about ε. Indeed, by Bayes rule we have
P (X = x |O = o) = P (O = o |X = x)P (X = x)∑
y∈XN P (O = o |X = y)P (X = y)
, (4.4)
where
P (O = o |X = x) = εn · (1− ε)N−n.
In addition,
P (X = x) =
∫ 1
0
P (X = x | θ)p(θ)dθ,
where
P (X = x | θ) = θ ax · (1− θ)N−ax ,
and p is the prior density on the unknown chance of X. Therefore, Assump-
tion (QP) depends on both ε and the prior belief p about the chances of
X.
In settings of prior near-ignorance the prior ignorance is modelled using
a set P of prior densities. In this case, (QP) holds only if it holds for each
p ∈ P . In the IBM, the set P is the set of all betas,t(θ) densities indexed by
a fixed s > 0 and all t ∈]0, 1[, defined by:
betas,t(θ) :=
Γ(s)
Γ(st)Γ(s(1− t))θ
st−1(1− θ)s(1−t)−1.
In this case, we know from (4.2) that
Pt(X = x) =
∏ax
i=1(st+ i− 1)
∏N−ax
j=1 (s(1− t) + j − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
.
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It follows that the IBM satisfies the assumption (QP) if and only if
Pt(X = o |O = o) ≥ K · Pt(X 6= o |O = o), (4.5)
or, equivalently, if and only if
Pt(X = o |O = o) ≥ K
K + 1
, (4.6)
for each t ∈]0, 1[. As shown in Theorem 36 and Corollary 37, the IBM does
not satisfy the condition (4.6) and consequently does not satisfy Assumption
(QP) if ε > 0. This result is surprising at first sight because ε can be
arbitrarily small. However, it is quite intuitive if we consider that t can
assume extreme values, arbitrarily close to 0 or 1.
Theorem 36 Consider the function Pt(X = o |O = o), with t ∈ ]0, 1[, where
o ∈ XN is a given data set and ε > 0.
1. If 0 < ao < N , Pt(X = o |O = o) has a unique global maximum in
]0, 1[ and no local extremes. Furthermore,
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0.
2. If ao = N , Pt(X = o |O = o) is strictly monotone increasing in ]0, 1[.
Furthermore,
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0, lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 1.
3. If ao = 0, Pt(X = o |O = o) is strictly monotone decreasing in ]0, 1[.
Furthermore,
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 1, lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0.
In particular, Theorem 36 implies that Assumption (QP) is satisfied in the
IBM only by prior densities such that t belongs to a proper subset of ]0, 1[.
Corollary 37 Let (QP) be satisfied by some t ∈]0, 1[. Given the observed
data set o, the following results hold.
1. If 0 < ao < N , there exist unique thresholds tmin > 0 and tmax < 1 such
that (QP) holds if and only if t ∈ [tmin, tmax].
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2. if ao = N , there exists a unique threshold tmin > 0 such that (QP) holds
if and only if t ∈ [tmin, 1[.
3. if ao = 0, there exists a unique threshold tmax < 1 such that (QP) holds
if and only if t ∈]0, tmax].
It follows that Assumption (QP) is equivalent to a restriction on the set
of admissible prior densities. We thus obtain a new approach to learning
under weak prior knowledge. For the rest of the paper we call the IBM with
the additional assumption (QP) the modified IBM (MIBM).
Let Iε be the restricted interval of admissible values for t implied by (QP).
Iε depends on the observed sample o, the probability of errors ε and the value
K in the assumption. The dependence of Iε on the parameters ε and K is
characterized by Theorem 38.
Theorem 38 For each observed data set o, if the interval Iε is not empty,
then it is monotone decreasing in ε and K with respect to the partial order
⊂. Furthermore
lim
ε→0
Iε =]0, 1[.
From Theorem 38, larger values of ε imply more severe restrictions on the
admissible values of t. The same argument can be expressed in the reverse
way. For instance, we can ask which is the largest value of ε in the MIBM
consistent with an arbitrarily weak restriction δ > 0 on the admissible values
of t, i.e., such that
[δ, 1− δ] ⊂ Iε.
From Theorem 38 it follows immediately that such a value of ε exists for
each observed data set o, as summarized by the following corollary.
Corollary 39 For each observed data set o, each K > 1 and each δ < 1
2
,
there exists εmax > 0 such that
[δ, 1− δ] ⊂ Iε ⇔ ε < εmax.
According to Corollary 37, Iε is a proper subset of ]0, 1[ for each ε > 0.
Therefore, the prior probabilities of the MIBM are not vacuous. It follows
that the MIBM is incompatible with the specification of prior near-ignorance.
However, Corollary 39 ensures that the restriction of the set of priors densi-
ties can be arbitrarily weak. Consequently, the implied specification of prior
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knowledge can be arbitrarily near to a condition of prior near-ignorance, pro-
vided that ε is sufficiently small. The restriction of the interval of admissible
values of t is a pragmatic solution to the problem of vacuous posterior prob-
abilities under imperfect observations. Assumption (QP) restricts the set of
admissible values of t in a transparent and interpretable way, which produces
non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities in the MIBM.
4.5 Comparison between the IBM and the
MIBM
From a fundamental point of view the IBM and the MIBM are very different
models. The IBM assumes that observation errors have zero probability;
this strong assumption allows to specify prior knowledge using the definition
of prior near-ignorance. The result is a model that produces non-vacuous
posterior probabilities. In particular, setting ε = 0 in equation (4.1), it
follows for each t ∈]0, 1[:
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) :=
ao + st
N + s
. (4.7)
Therefore,
P IBM(X = x |O = o) := a
o
N + s
,
P
IBM
(X = x |O = o) := a
o + s
N + s
.
In the MIBM it is assumed that observation errors are possible with prob-
ability ε > 0. In addition, Assumption (QP) is imposed. This leads to a
restriction of the interval of admissible values of t, which is incompatible
with the definition of prior near-ignorance used in the IBM.
Despite their conceptual difference, the MIBM and the IBM produce,
under suitable conditions on ε and K, similar results.
Theorem 40 Given an observed data set o and the corresponding restricted
interval Iε implied by Assumption (QP), it follows for each t ∈ Iε:
|Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)| <
1
K + 1
N
N + s
.
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Theorem 40 shows that, for large values of K and each t ∈ Iε, the distance
between the MIBM and the IBM is small. A stronger reverse argument is
developed in Theorem 41. There, we specify an arbitrary maximal tolerance
δ > 0 and show that the difference of the prior, the posterior and the lower
and upper predictive probabilities of the MIBM and the IBM can be made
smaller than δ when ε is sufficiently small. At the same time, the specification
of prior knowledge can be made arbitrarily weak for δ → 0.
Theorem 41 For each observed data set o and 0 < δ < 1
2
, there exists
εmax > 0 such that [δ, 1 − δ] ⊂ Iε for each ε < εmax and the following
inequalities hold:
|P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)| < δ, (4.8)
|P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)| < δ. (4.9)
Moreover,
|Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)| < δ, (4.10)
for all t ∈ Iε.
The parameter δ in Theorem 41 can be interpreted as a measure of the size
of the differences in the sets of prior and posterior predictive probabilities
implied by the two approaches. If the distance between the prior, the pos-
terior and the lower and upper probabilities of the two settings is smaller
than δ, and δ is chosen sufficiently small, then we might consider the two
approaches as equivalent for practical purposes. Theorem 41 ensures that,
given an observed data set o, there exists a threshold εmax such that the
MIBM and the IBM are equivalent if ε < εmax. This result yields a possible
explanation for the usefulness of the IBM in applications characterized by
imperfect observations with small probability of observation errors.
Example 42 Suppose that we have observed a data set o with N = 10 and
ao = 5. We specify a maximal tolerance δ = 0.01 and verify if the MIBM
and the IBM are equivalent at this level of tolerance, given a probability of
observation errors ε.
For ε = 0.05, the interval Iε is not empty for each K < 1.174. Setting
K = 1, we obtain
Iε = [0.012, 0.988] + [δ, 1− δ] = [0.01, 0.99].
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The construction of the interval Iε in this and the next case is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. Because the interval Iε is monotone decreasing in K, for each
K > 1 we have Iε = [0.012, 0.988] + [δ, 1− δ]. Therefore the MIBM and the
IBM are not equivalent in this case. According to our tolerance δ = 0.01, the
probability of observation errors ε = 0.05 is too large for the two models to
be equivalent.
If ε = 0.01, the interval Iε is not empty for each K < 7.8. Setting
K = 6.5, we obtain
Iε = [0.0000083, 0.9999917] ⊃ [0.01, 0.99].
Moreover,
|P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)| ∼= 0.0092 < δ = 0.01,
|P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)| ∼= 0.0092 < δ = 0.01,
and
max
t∈Iε
|Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)| ∼= 0.0092 < δ = 0.01.
In this case, the two approaches are equivalent given the tolerance δ = 0.01.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2. From these results, we deduce that in this
example εmax is larger than 0.01 and smaller than 0.05.
4.6 Conclusions
The specification of prior near-ignorance in Walley (1996) is incompatible
with imperfect observations: a direct extension of the IBM to this case leads
to vacuous posterior probabilities. This result is due to the presence of quasi-
deterministic priors in the set of priors densities of the IBM.
In this paper we propose a modification of the IBM that enables to learn
from imperfect observations for small values of the observation error proba-
bility ε. The proposed approach, called modified IBM (MIBM), is based on
the additional assumption of quasi perfection. This assumption restricts in
a natural way the set of admissible prior densities in the IBM and eliminates
the problematic quasi-degenerate prior densities. The specification of prior
knowledge in the MIBM can be arbitrarily weak, although never compatible
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with the exact definition of prior near-ignorance in Walley (1996). Further-
more, the probabilities produced by the MIBM and the IBM can be made
arbitrarily close when ε is sufficiently small. This result yields a possible ex-
planation for the usefulness of the IBM in applications where the probability
of observation errors is small.
The results of this paper are a first step towards a theory of learning
from imperfect observations under weak prior knowledge. Further research
is needed to understand the implications of the assumption of quasi perfection
in the general multinomial case.
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Figure 4.1: The function Pt(X = o |O = o) for an observed dataset o of
length N = 10 with ao = 5 and s = 2. In the left panel the function is plotted
for ε = 0.05. SettingK := 1 in the Assumption (QP), we find Iε searching the
values of t for which the function is larger than 1
1+1
= 0.5. With a bisection
algorithm with precision 10−14, we find that Iε = [0.012, 0.988]. In the right
panel the same function is plotted for ε = 0.01. Setting K := 6.5 we search
the values of t for which the function is larger than 6.5
6.5+1
∼ 0.8667. Using
the same bisection algorithm as above, we find Iε = [0.0000083, 0.9999917].
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
t
Figure 4.2: The values of Pt(X = x |O = o) (left panel) and of P IBMt (X =
x |O = o) (right panel) for K = 6.5. The results produced are so similar,
and the restriction on the possible values of t implied by (QP) in this case
so small, that the two plots are nearly indistinguishable.
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4.7 Technical results
Lemma 43 Consider the functions fi(t) ∈ C2(]0, 1[) for i = 1, . . . ,m, where
m ≥ 1.
1. If fi(t) > 0, f
′
i(t) > 0 and f
′′
i (t) > 0 for each i = 1, . . . ,m and each
t ∈ ]0, 1[, then(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′′
> 0,
for each t ∈ ]0, 1[.
2. If fi(t) > 0, f
′
i(t) < 0 and f
′′
i (t) > 0 for each i = 1, . . . ,m and each
t ∈ ]0, 1[, then(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′
< 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′′
> 0,
for each t ∈ ]0, 1[.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on m. We begin with m = 2.
Clearly f1(t) · f2(t) > 0 because both functions are positive. For the first
derivative we have
(f1(t) · f2(t))′ = f ′1(t) · f2(t) + f1(t) · f ′2(t).
If f ′i(t) > 0 for i = 1, 2, (f1(t) · f2(t))′ > 0. If f ′i(t) < 0 for i = 1, 2,
(f1(t) · f2(t))′ < 0. For the second derivative we have
(f1(t) · f2(t))′′ = f ′′1 (t) · f2(t) + 2f ′1(t) · f ′2(t) + f1(t) · f ′′2 (t).
If f ′i(t) > 0 and f
′′
i (t) > 0 for i = 1, 2, (f1(t) · f2(t))′′ > 0. If f ′i(t) < 0 and
f ′′i (t) > 0 for i = 1, 2, f
′
1(t) · f ′2(t) > 0 and therefore (f1(t) · f2(t))′′ > 0.
Denote now with f(t) the function
f(t) =
m−1∏
i=1
fi(t).
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Assume that f(t) > 0, f ′(t) > 0 and f ′′(t) > 0. Substituting f1(t) with f(t)
and f2(t) with fm(t) in the calculations above we obtain(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′′
> 0.
In the same way, assuming f(t) > 0, f ′(t) < 0 and f ′′(t) > 0 we obtain that(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)
> 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′
< 0,
(
m∏
i=1
fi(t)
)′′
> 0.
Lemma 44 Let M,H ≥ 0 be two real constants, s > 0 and t ∈ ]0, 1[. Then
the function
f(t) :=
st+H
s(1− t) +M
is such that f(t) > 0, f ′(t) > 0 and f ′′(t) > 0.
Proof. We have st+H > 0, s(1−t)+M > 0 and hence f(t) > 0. Calculating
the first derivative we obtain
f˙(t) =
s(s(1− t) +M)− (st+H)(−s)
(s(1− t) +M)2 =
s(M +H) + s2
(s(1− t) +M)2 > 0.
Finally, calculating the second derivative, we obtain
f ′′(t) = (s(M +H) + s2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (−2(s(1− t) +M)−3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· (−s)︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0.
Lemma 45 Let M,H ≥ 0 be two real constants, s > 0 and t ∈ ]0, 1[. Then
the function
f(t) :=
s(1− t) +H
st+M
is such that f(t) > 0, f ′(t) < 0 and f ′′(t) > 0.
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Proof. We have s(1 − t) + H > 0, st + M > 0 and therefore f(t) > 0.
Calculating the first derivative we obtain
f˙(t) =
−s(st+M)− s(s(1− t) +H)
(st+M)2
= −(s(M +H) + s
2)
(st+M)2
< 0.
Finally, calculating the second derivative we obtain
f ′′(t) = −(s(M +H) + s2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· (−2(st+M)−3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· s︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0.
Lemma 46 Let o,x ∈ XN be fixed but arbitrary.
1. If ax = ao, it follows (
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)′′
= 0.
2. If ax 6= ao, it follows (
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)′′
> 0.
Proof. From (4.2) we know that
Pt(X = x) =
∏ax
i=1(st+ i− 1)
∏N−ax
j=1 (s(1− t) + j − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
,
therefore
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
=
∏ax
i=1(st+ i− 1)
∏N−ax
j=1 (s(1− t) + j − 1)∏ao
h=1(st+ h− 1)
∏N−ao
k=1 (s(1− t) + k − 1)
.
If ax = ao
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
= 1⇒
(
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)′′
= 0.
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If ax > ao, setting K := ax − ao, we have
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
=
∏ax
h=ao+1(st+ h− 1)∏N−ao
k=N−ax+1(s(1− t) + k − 1)
=
∏K
i=1(st+ a
o + i− 1)∏K
j=1(s(1− t) +N − ax + j − 1)
=
K∏
i=1
(
st+ (ao + i− 1)
s(1− t) + (N − ax + i− 1)
)
. (4.11)
Because of Lemma 44, each factor in (4.11) is a function that satisfies the
assumptions of the first statement of Lemma 43. Therefore we conclude that(
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)′′
> 0.
If ax < ao, setting K := ao − ax, we have
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
=
∏K
i=1(s(1− t) +N − ao + i− 1)∏K
j=1(st+ a
x + j − 1)
=
K∏
i=1
(
s(1− t) + (N − ao + i− 1)
st+ (ax + i− 1)
)
. (4.12)
Because of Lemma 45, each factor in (4.12) is a function that satisfies the
assumptions of the second statement of Lemma 43. Therefore we conclude
that (
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)′′
> 0.
4.8 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 35
For simplicity, we use following notation:
P (O = o |x) := P (O = o |X = x),
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Pt(x) := Pt(X = x),
P ′t(x) :=
δ
δt
Pt(X = x).
We show that δ
δt
Pt(X = x |O = o) > 0 for each t ∈ ]0, 1[, each o ∈ XN and
each ε > 0.
We first note that Equation (4.1) can be rewritten as
Pt(X = x |O = o) = 1
N + s
∑
x∈XN P (O = o |x)Pt(x)ax∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
+
st
N + s
.
Therefore,
δ
δt
Pt(X = x |O = o) = 1
N + s︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
δ
δt
(∑
x∈XN P (O = o |x)Pt(x)ax∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)
+
s
N + s︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
(4.13)
In the rest of the proof, we show:
δ
δt
(∑
x∈XN P (O = o |x)Pt(x)ax∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)
≥ 0.
Calculating the derivative on the left hand side, we obtain
δ
δt
(∑
x∈XN P (O = o |x)Pt(x)ax∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)
=
1(∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)2 ·
·
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |x)P˙t(x)ax ·
∑
y∈XN
P (O = o |y)Pt(y) −
−
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |x)Pt(x)ax ·
∑
y∈XN
P (O = o |y)P˙t(y)
 =
=
1(∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)2 ·
·
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |x)P˙t(x)ax ·
∑
y∈XN
P (O = o |y)Pt(y)) −
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−
∑
y∈XN
P (O = o |y)Pt(y)ay ·
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |x)P˙t(x)
 =
=
1(∑
y∈XN P (O = o |y)Pt(y)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·
·
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay).
It follows that, if∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay) ≥ 0,
then
δ
δt
Pt(X = x |O = o) > 0.
The former expression can be written as∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay) =
=
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax>ay
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay)+
+
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax=ay
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y) (ax − ay)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
+
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax<ay
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay) =
=
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax>ay
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)P˙t(x)Pt(y)(ax − ay)+
+
∑
(y,x)∈(XN )2, ay<ax
P (O = o |y)P (O = o |x)P˙t(y)Pt(x)(ay − ax) =
=
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax>ay
P (O = o |x)P (O = o |y)(ax−ay)(P˙t(x)Pt(y)−P˙t(y)Pt(x)) =
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=
∑
(x,y)∈(XN )2, ax>ay
P (O = o |x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
P (O = o |y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(ax − ay)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Pt(y)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
δ
δt
(
Pt(x)
Pt(y)
)
.
Therefore, if for each couple (x,y) ∈ (XN)2 such that ax > ay we have
δ
δt
(
Pt(x)
Pt(y)
)
> 0,
then:
δ
δt
Pt(X = x |O = o) > 0.
Using (4.2) for ax > ay we have
Pt(x)
Pt(y)
=
∏ax
h=ay+1(st+ h− 1)∏N−ay
h=N−ax+1(s(1− t) + h− 1)
. (4.14)
It is evident that the numerator of (4.14) is strictly increasing in t and that the
denominator is strictly decreasing in t. Therefore, (4.14) is strictly increasing
in t,
δ
δt
(
Pt(x)
Pt(y)
)
> 0
and
δ
δt
Pt(X = x |O = o) > 0.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 35.
Proof of Theorem 36 and Corollary 37
Let o ∈ XN be fixed. If ε > 0, we know from (4.3) that for every x ∈ XN ,
P (O = o |X = x) > 0. It then follows
Pt(X = o |O = o) = P (O = o |X = o) · Pt(X = o)
Pt(O = o)
=
=
P (O = o |X = o) · Pt(X = o)∑
x∈XN P (O = o |X = x) · Pt(X = x)
= (4.15)
=
1
1 +
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
(
P (O = o |X = x)
P (O = o |X = o)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
Pt(X = x)
Pt(X = o)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Convex
. (4.16)
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According to Lemma 46, the denominator of (4.16) is a positive linear com-
bination of convex and strictly convex functions, and is therefore strictly
convex. It follows that either (4.16) has a unique maximum in ]0, 1[ and
no local extremes, or it is a strictly monotone function. In order to distin-
guish these cases, we study the numerator and the denominator of (4.15).
According to (4.2), we have
Pt(X = o) =
∏ao
i=1(st+ i− 1)
∏N−ao
j=1 (s(1− t) + j − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
. (4.17)
If 0 < ao < N , the numerator of (4.17) is a product containing as fac-
tors t, (1 − t) and other strictly positive and bounded factors. Therefore,
limt→0 Pt(X = o) = limt→1 Pt(X = o) = 0. If ao = N ,
Pt(X = o) =
∏N
k=1(st+ k − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
, (4.18)
limt→0 P (X = o) = 0 and limt→1 Pt(X = o) = 1. If ao = 0,
Pt(X = o) =
∏N
k=1(s(1− t) + k − 1)∏N
k=1(s+ k − 1)
. (4.19)
Therefore limt→0 Pt(X = o) = 1 and limt→1 Pt(X = o) = 0. Denote with oN
the data set with aoN = N and with o0 the data set with a
o0 = 0. When
calculating the same type of limits for the denominator of (4.15) we obtain
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following results.
limt→0
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |X = x) · Pt(X = x) =
=
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |X = x) · lim
t→0
Pt(X = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, ∀x6=o0
=
= P (O = o |X = o0) · lim
t→0
Pt(X = o0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= P (O = o |X = o0) > 0,
limt→1
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |X = x) · Pt(X = x) =
=
∑
x∈XN
P (O = o |X = x) · lim
t→1
Pt(X = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, ∀x6=oN
=
= P (O = o |X = oN) · lim
t→1
Pt(X = oN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= P (O = o |X = oN) > 0.
We can now prove the three statements in the theorem. If 0 < ao < N it
follows immediately from the above limits that
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0
P (O = o |X = o0) = 0,
lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0
P (O = o |X = oN) = 0.
In addition, because the denominator of (4.16) is strictly convex, Pt(X =
o |O = o) has in this case a unique maximum in the interior of ]0, 1[. If
ao = N and therefore o = oN , we obtain with the same arguments as above:
lim
t→0
Pt(X = oN |O = oN) = 0
P (O = oN |X = o0) = 0,
lim
t→1
Pt(X = oN |O = oN) = P (O = oN |X = oN)
P (O = oN |X = oN) = 1.
Because the denominator of (4.16) is strictly convex and 0 ≤ Pt(X = o |O =
o) ≤ 1, the latter function is strictly monotone increasing in ]0, 1[. If ao = 0
and therefore o = o0, we have
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o0 |O = o0) = P (O = o0 |X = o0)
P (O = o0 |X = o0) = 1,
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lim
t→1
Pt(X = o0 |O = o0) = 0
P (O = o0 |X = oN) = 0.
Because the denominator of (4.16) is strictly convex and 0 ≤ Pt(X = o |O =
o) ≤ 1, the latter function is strictly monotone decreasing in ]0, 1[. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 36.
To prove Corollary 37 let
max
t∈ ]0,1[
Pt(X = o |O = o) > K
K + 1
.
According to Theorem 36, if 0 < ao < N there exist two values tmin < tmax
such that tmin, tmax ∈ ]0, 1[ and
Ptmin(X = o |O = o) = Ptmax(X = o |O = o) =
K
K + 1
.
Because the function Pt(X = o |O = o) has no local maxima, it follows that
Pt(X = o |O = o) ≥ K
K + 1
⇔ t ∈ [tmin, tmax].
If ao = N , Pt(X = o |O = o) is a monotone increasing function of t, such
that
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0,
lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 1.
Therefore, there exists tmin < 1 such that
Pt(X = o |O = o) ≥ K
K + 1
⇔ t ∈ [tmin, 1[.
Finally, if ao = 0, Pt(X = o |O = o) is a monotone decreasing function of t
such that
lim
t→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 1,
lim
t→1
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 0.
Therefore, there exists tmax < 1 such that
Pt(X = o |O = o) ≥ K
K + 1
⇔ t ∈]0, tmax].
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Proof of Theorem 38 and Corollary 39
Consider a data set x ∈ XN such that x 6= o. Denote with nx the number
of outcomes in x different from outcomes in o, where nx ≥ 1. Then, using
(4.3), we have
P (O = o |X = x)
P (O = o |X = o) =
εn
x
(1− ε)N−nx
(1− ε)N =
(
ε
1− ε
)nx
. (4.20)
(4.20) is strictly monotone increasing in ε. Moreover, we can rewrite (4.16)
as
Pt(X = o |O = o) = 1
1 +
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
(
ε
1−ε
)nx (Pt(X=x)
Pt(X=o)
) . (4.21)
Because the term Pt(X=x)
Pt(X=o)
does not depend on ε, the denominator of (4.21) is
strictly monotone increasing in ε and therefore Pt(X = o |O = o) is strictly
monotone decreasing in ε. Now, calculating limε→0 in (4.21), we obtain
lim
ε→0
Pt(X = o |O = o) = lim
ε→0
1
1 +
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
(
ε
1− ε
)nx
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
(
Pt(X=x)
Pt(X=o)
) = 1.
(4.22)
The interval Iε is such that
Pt(X = o |O = o) > K
K + 1
⇔ t ∈ Iε.
It follows immediately that for a fixed ε, if the interval Iε is non-empty,
then it is monotone decreasing in K with respect to the partial order ⊂.
Analogously, because Pt(X = o |O = o) is decreasing in ε, for any fixed K,
if the interval Iε is non-empty, then it is monotone decreasing in ε. Finally,
for each K > 1 we have K
K+1
< 1. Therefore, because of (4.22), we have
limε→0 Iε =]0, 1[. This concludes the proof of Theorem 38
We prove now Corollary 39. The interval Iε is such that
Pt(X = o |O = o) > K
K + 1
⇔ t ∈ Iε.
Therefore, according to Theorem 36, [δ, 1 − δ] ⊂ Iε if and only if Pt=δ(X =
o |O = o) > K
K+1
and Pt=1−δ(X = o |O = o) > KK+1 .
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We know from Theorem 38 that Iε increases monotonically with decreas-
ing ε and that limε→0 Iε =]0, 1[ for each K > 1. It follows immediately that
there exists a unique εmax such that:
[δ, 1− δ] ⊆ Iε ⇔ ε ≤ εmax.
Therefore
[δ, 1− δ] ⊂ Iε ⇔ ε < εmax.
Proof of Theorem 40
The formula (4.1) can be rewritten as,
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o) · a
x + st
N + s
. (4.23)
Assumption (QP) is equivalent to
Pt(X 6= o |O = o) ≤ 1
K + 1
, (4.24)
for each t ∈ I. We prove the statement of Theorem 40 in the three cases
0 < ao < N , ao = N and ao = 0. We begin with the case 0 < ao < N .
Without loss of generality, let ε be small enough to obtain for the given K a
nonempty interval I := [tmin, tmax]. Using (4.23), we find, for each t ∈ I, the
following bounds for Pt(X = x |O = o):
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
=
= Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
<
< Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o)N + st
N + s
=
= Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+ Pt(X 6= o |O = o)N + st
N + s
. (4.25)
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The maximum of (4.25) is attained when the weight assigned to N+st
N+s
is
maximal and the weight assigned to a
o+st
N+s
is minimal, because ao < N .
According to Assumption 4.24, we obtain
Pt(X = x |O = o) < K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
N + st
N + s
. (4.26)
In the same way, we obtain
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
>
> Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o) st
N + s
=
= Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+ Pt(X 6= o |O = o) st
N + s
≥
≥ K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
st
N + s
. (4.27)
Remember that the value
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) :=
ao + st
N + s
,
is the posterior probability in the IBM for the same value of t as above, but
when o is observed perfectly. It is easily verified that
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) <
K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
N + st
N + s
,
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) >
K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
st
N + s
.
Therefore, the interval[
K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
st
N + s
,
K
K + 1
ao + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
N + st
N + s
]
,
contains both Pt(X = x |O = o) and P IBMt (X = x |O = o), and it follows∣∣Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣ < 1K + 1 NN + s.
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Assume ao = N . We now have a non empty interval Iε := [tmin, 1[⊂]0, 1[
such that (4.24) is satisfied for each t ∈ Iε. Therefore, for each t ∈ Iε we
have
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
=
= Pt(X = o |O = o)a
o + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
<
< Pt(X = o |O = o)N + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o)N + st
N + s
=
= Pt(X = o |O = o)N + st
N + s
+ Pt(X 6= o |O = o)N + st
N + s
=
N + st
N + s
,
(4.28)
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
>
> Pt(X = o |O = o)N + st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o) st
N + s
≥
≥ K
K + 1
N + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
st
N + s
. (4.29)
In this case
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) :=
N + st
N + s
.
Therefore, ∣∣Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣ <
<
N + st
N + s
−
(
K
K + 1
N + st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
st
N + s
)
=
=
1
K + 1
N
N + s
.
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Finally, assume ao = 0. We now have a non empty interval Iε :=]0, tmax] such
that (4.24) is satisfied for each t ∈ Iε. Therefore, for each t ∈ Iε it follows
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
<
< Pt(X = o |O = o) st
N + s
+
∑
x∈XN ,x6=o
Pt(X = x |O = o)N + st
N + s
≤
≤ K
K + 1
st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
N + st
N + s
, (4.30)
Pt(X = x |O = o) =
∑
x∈XN
Pt(X = x |O = o)a
x + st
N + s
>
> Pt(X = o |O = o) st
N + s
+ Pt(X 6= o |O = o) st
N + s
=
=
st
N + s
. (4.31)
In this case
P IBMt (X = x |O = o) :=
st
N + s
,
and therefore ∣∣Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣ <
<
K
K + 1
st
N + s
+
1
K + 1
N + st
N + s
− st
N + s
=
=
1
K + 1
N
N + s
.
Proof of Theorem 41
Given δ, denote by δ˜ the value such that
δ =
N + 2s
N + s
· δ˜.
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Clearly, δ˜ < δ. Given O = o, denote by K˜ the minimal K > 1 such that
1
K + 1
N
N + s
≤ δ˜.
Given K˜, according to Corollary 39, there exists an εmax > 0 such that, for
each ε < εmax,
[δ˜, 1− δ˜] ⊂ Iε,
and, because δ > δ˜,
[δ, 1− δ] ⊂ Iε.
According to Theorem 40, we have
|Pt(X = x |O = o)−P IBMt (X = x |O = o)| <
1
K˜ + 1
N
N + s
≤ δ˜ < δ, (4.32)
for each t ∈ Iε. We show now that for each ε < εmax, (4.8) and (4.9) hold.
Define t := inft∈Iε t and t := supt∈Iε t. We have∣∣∣P IBM(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣ a+ sN + s − a+ stN + s
∣∣∣∣ = s(1− t)N + s < sδ˜N + s, (4.33)
and ∣∣P IBM(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣ aN + s − a+ stN + s
∣∣∣∣ = stN + s < sδ˜N + s. (4.34)
Pt(X = x |O = o) is continuous and increasing in t. For t < 1 and t > 0 it
follows:
P (X = x |O = o) = Pt(X = x |O = o), (4.35)
P (X = x |O = o) = Pt(X = x |O = o). (4.36)
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It follows that, if t < 1,∣∣∣P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣∣ =
≤ ∣∣P (X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣+
+
∣∣∣P IBMt (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣∣ =
(4.35)
=
∣∣Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣+
+
∣∣∣P IBMt (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣∣ <
(4.32)+(4.33)
< δ˜ +
sδ˜
N + s
=
(
N + 2s
N + s
)
δ˜ = δ. (4.37)
Analogously, if t > 0,∣∣P (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣ =
≤ ∣∣P (X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣+
+
∣∣P IBMt (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣ =
(4.36)
=
∣∣Pt(X = x |O = o)− P IBMt (X = x |O = o)∣∣+
+
∣∣P IBMt (X = x |O = o)− P IBM(X = x |O = o)∣∣ <
(4.32)+(4.34)
< δ˜ +
sδ˜
N + s
=
(
N + 2s
N + s
)
δ˜ = δ. (4.38)
We distinguish between the three cases: ao = 0, ao = N , and 0 < ao < N .
According to Corollary 37 we have
• ao = 0 ⇒ t = 0 and t < 1,
• 0 < ao < N ⇒ t > 0 and t < 1,
• ao = N ⇒ t > 0 and t = 1.
Furthermore, for t = 0,
P (X = x |O = o) = 0 = P IBM(X = x |O = o). (4.39)
Analogously, for t = 1,
P (X = x |O = o) = 1 = P IBM(X = x |O = o). (4.40)
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Combining the above results, we see that (4.8) and (4.9) are satisfied in each
case: if ao = 0 because of (4.37) and (4.39), if ao = N because of (4.38) and
(4.40). Finally, if 0 < ao < N , (4.8) and (4.9) are satisfied because of (4.37)
and (4.38).
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and outlook
The question of learning under prior near-ignorance is fundamental in statis-
tics. Our results highlight a serious problem related to prior near-ignorance,
which had, to the best of our knowledge, not been previously recognized:
learning under prior near-ignorance with imperfect observational processes
is generally impossible. This problem concerns several statistical models, be-
cause (i) statistics is often concerned with prior ignorance and (ii) imperfect
observations and signals belong to most real applications.
Statistical models need a sound theoretical foundation to yield useful con-
clusions. For models concerned with prior near-ignorance this foundation
seems to be missing to some extent, as pointed out by our research. It ap-
pears therefore important to develop a theory able to isolate situations of
prior near-ignorance where learning from imperfect observations is possible,
from others. In our research we have identified a general sufficient condition
that, if satisfied, prevents learning under prior near-ignorance to take place.
In the particular case of categorical signals with Dirichlet priors we have
already derived necessary and sufficient conditions for learning under prior
near-ignorance.
In the case of manifest variables not allowing for learning under prior
near-ignorance, it will be necessary to identify additional assumptions and
alternative models that permit learning to take place. In the present work,
we have proposed such an assumption in the simple but important case of the
imprecise Beta model. The proposed assumption, called quasi-perfection, is
particularly suited for imperfect observation processes characterized by a very
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small probability of error. We have shown that the IBM modified with our
additional assumption is actually able to learn from imperfect observations
with a specification of prior knowledge that can be arbitrary weak, depending
on the given probability of error. Furthermore, we have shown that the results
produced by the modified model are arbitrary close to those produced by the
standard IBM considering the observations as perfect.
Although our results suggest a possible way to obtain models able to learn
from imperfect signals, many questions and issues remain to be investigated.
Firstly, it would be necessary to extend the results obtained in the binary
case to the general multinomial case. Furthermore, it would be important
to investigate the theoretical properties of the IBM (or IDM) modified with
the assumption of quasi perfection. Actually, the IDM satisfies many impor-
tant principles that are desirable for learning under prior ignorance, like the
symmetry principle, the representation invariance principle, the likelihood
principle, and others; it is not clear ex-ante which properties remain valid
after the addition of the assumption of quasi perfection. To study this issue,
it would be necessary to adapt the definitions of these principles to the case
of imperfect observation, and verify the theoretical properties of the modified
model.
In general, it would be important to identify additional assumptions and
alternative models that permit learning under prior ignorance to take place
in settings relevant for practical applications.
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